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INTRODUCTION

Problem, Definitions, and Procedure

2

Such is the importance which modern philosophy has recognized
in the Time problem

that a host of questions emerg�s upon the

very mention of the words Time and
move?

Eternity.

Does time really

In what sense, if any, is the future determined?

the past exist?

\11/hat can be the meaning of

what sense can a thing be and yet change?

present?

Does
In

Can a future life

If God is eternal, can He be personal?

be eternal?

However, in the present discourse we forego detailed dis
cussions of these interesting problems except as they bear on
what we consider a more basic problem, namely, the problem of
the relation of Eternity and Time to reality.

Are Time and

Eternity actually parts of the existing universe?
real and Time illusmvy?
Are both real?

Is Eternity

Is Time real and Eternity a myth?

Or do both belong to the subjective realm?

such is our problem.
In order that our undertaking may proceed with clarity we
endeavor to get at working definitions of the principal terms,
our problem more concisel:y; and to outline the gen-

to present

eral characteristics of each of the major types of theory which
we have found in the history of philosophy.
By.!!,__�

we mean that regular one directional successive

order of before and after which is ordinarily meant by the word.
It should be carefully noted that we are not talking about mere
succession

as such.

The duree of Bergson has, as we shall see,

some nlace in reality; but it is not, strictly speaking, Time.
By Eternity

we mean that order of existence which is conceived
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to be altogether without successiveness.

Eternity is not infini

ty of time, nor is it a strange indefinable state that eludes ap
prehension.

It is timelessness, the state of being altogether in

denendent of succession.

By Reality

we mean that which is, or

exists, whether in idea only or in fact, whether as changing or
as changeless.

At the same time we recognize that there are de

grees of reality�so that that which is both in idea and in fact
is more real than that which is in idea on�y.
We are fully aware that the above are not the only possible
definitions for the terms indicated.

However, for the sake of

definiteness some reasonably precise meaning has to be given to
important terms.

From this point onward the terms Time and Etern-

2:ty

will be used according to the definitions

and Reality

which we have given.

In the light of our definition of terms

we may state our problem somewhat more precisely

as follows:

�a� !s the relation of that regular one directional succession
of before and after which
apart from succession
order of things�

2:E

��lled Time and that state of being

which is called Eternity

Does one of these two belong to the existing

order of things and the other not?
ing universe?
universe?

,� �he existing

Do both belong to the exist

If so, to what extent do they have a part in that

Do they tell the whole story about the universe ?

In general) the history of philosophy has presented four
main types of theory relative to our problem.

The first is the

theory that Eternity is a real state of all reality and that
Time belongs only to the realm of the 'illusory.

The second. is
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the theory that Time is a state of practically all reality and
that Eternity either does not apply to reality at all or is of
little importance.

The third is the theory that Time and Eterni

ty form a harmonious pattern which embraces all reality.

The

fourth is the theory that Time and Eternity are concepts which
mind has fastened

somewhat arbitrarily upon a reality which

intrinsically is characterized by quite other states than those
of Time and Eternity.

Using the terms not simply in their or

dinary senses but technically

in the senses of the theories

above, we designate the first

Absolutism; the second, Material

ism; the third, Idealism;

and the fourth, Spiritualism.

we

recognize that in some particular13.>violence is done to the his
torical meanings of the above terms. (1) This is almost inevi
table, since the terms were not developed primarily to describe
theories of Time and Eternity.

However, some terms must be used,

and we believe that the above will be found to be appropriate
in the main.
In the following pages we shall undertake, first, to trace
the history of our problem, sketching in order the presentation
of each of the above

theories and, second, to summarize what

seem to be the major contributions and defects of each.

1. Probably the greatest difficulty concerns the use of the term
Idealism.

However, we believe that even here our use of the term

is in fundamental accord with

the use of the term as ap9lied to

the thought of Plato, the founder of Idealism.

PART I
Historical Sketch
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I. primitive Thought and the Emergence
A. Primitive man as he looked

o ut

of

Philosophy

upon reality saw )not an

ordered universe nor, as far as he knew, a universe at all. The
world came to him as a weltering mass of impressions not unlike
that which makes its way into the dawning consciousness of an
infant.

There was neither world nor sun nor mo on - only shapes

and shadows, lights and colors, changes and familiar objects,
to which he never thought

of

sponded as he had been taught
meant nothing to him.

giving names, but to which he re
of

nature.

Reality and unreality

It was with the greatest difficul t y that

he distinguished even imperfectly between his dreams and his
waking experiences.

His world was indeed spread

out

and his ex

periences of it successive; but it did not occur to him
think of it so.
1

1,

to

Thus, for many centuries the idea of Time did

not distinctly arise in the mind of man.
B. As the centuries rolled pas� man gradually came to im
prove upon his primitive condition, b oth within and with out. He
learned not only to meet danger when he c9nfronted it, but to
prepare for it.

He learned t o form images

not present with him for the moment.

of

things that were

He began to learn

to

c on

trol the babbling sounds that came from his tl1roat and to give
names to things.
each set

of

At first each

object

distinct circumstances.

had a different name in

But gradually it was found

to be more convenient to give a standard name to each

o bject,

its relation being designated only by varying inflections.

In

time cooperatio n bet ween men was marvelously improved by grouping
kinds

of

objects under class names.

In the c ourse

j discrimination became more acute and more daring.

of

the centuries

The days came
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when there was an idea of a total universe as distinct from its
parts, a dim notion of causality had arisen, thought began to
apply itself to other enterprizes than crops and conquests.
Men began to speculate with regard_to the origin and the course
of the order of things in which they found themselves.

The stage

was set for the dawning of philosophy and then for the discovery
in thought of the distinction between Eternity and Time.

c.

The emergence of philosophy as distinct from mythology

and religion is generally made to coincide with the Greek phy
sicist Thales.

One cannot but feel that this procedure �s some

what arbitrary, since unquestionably men had long been seriously
inquiring into the meaning and origin of the universe many cen
turies earlier, both in Egypt and in Babylon.

That their contem

plation led them to trace the course of things to causes which
were not thought of as primarily of a rational character certain
ly need not place their thought altogether outside the realm of
philosophy.

As we shall presently see, their influence upon cer

tain Greek philosophers was considerable.

However, as regards our

formal effort to trace the history of thought, we may well follow
the usual procedure and begin with Thales, referring back to
Oriental thought in so far as the requirements of historical claPi-

. ty may demand.

'

The Greek thinkers of the earliest group, the s chool of Mi-

. letus, like their distant primitive forebears, had not yet come to
distinguish Time from the weltering movements that surrounded and
pressed in upon them.

What impressed them was that here was a

world that was too complex and changing to be as it appeared.

It

8

must have a simpler origin, some more clearly apprehensible prin
ciple from which it derived its being.

Thus Thales, Anaximander,

and Anaximines traced the complex universe to single elements.
Thales found the source of things in water, Anaximander in what
we might call ether,and Anaximines in air or breath. (1) Here
then was an effort to distinguish the ultimate sources and pro
cess of the universe from its appearances, but as yet no dis
tinction between Eternity and Time as aspects of Being.

1. Cp. Weber and Perry, A History of Hlhilosophy, pp. 9, 10.
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II. Greek Philosophy and the Formulation of Three Basic Theories
A. The Emergence of the Intellectual Distinction between
Eternity and Time
The philosophers known as the Eleatic school began where
the Miletians left off.

Impressed by the effort of the Mile

tians to trace all reality to a single element, they were dis
satisfied with the attempt to find the ultimate source of things
in something that was a sensibly discernible part of the universe.
This seemed an illegitimate attempt to find the cause in one of
the effects.

This discontent, doubtless coupled with the in

fluence of an Oriental philosophy which tended to minimize ap
pearances and emphasize the idea of supersensuous Unity, led
to the discovery of the general concept of Being which·they sub
stituted for the physical substances to which the Miletians had
traced the universe.
.

Moreover, the Eleatics found that the at-

tempt to derive the complex changing order of things from a sin
gle uniform substance was not by any means so simple as the Mi
letians had supposed.

The procedure of the latter had overlooked

a major problem, the apparent coexistence of permanence and
change.

To the Eleatics themselves permanence and change,

seemed

so' utterly unreconcilable that they undertook to deny change
and make Being all in all.
Since this procedure was quite out of acco�d with commonly
accepted opinions, the Elsatics were obliged to draw out the
inferences of their point of view and to defend it with shrewd
argum ents.

It was perhaps in the controversy which was thus

aroused that Time and Eternity were first brought into distinct
in telledtual contrast in Western thought.

Parmenides•s idea

10
that only Being is real needed only to be stated to call forth
the objection that our impression of events as before and after
Thus was Par

one another was not accounted for in the theory.

menides obliged fairly to confront the problem of Time in its
relation to Eternity.
B . The Eleatic School: The Absolutist Theory
The initial impulse out of which the theory which denies
Time and affirms the reality of Eternity a�ose was Oriental
rather than Occidental.

The general tendency of Oriental thought

for centuries had been to sum all up under One, to attempt to
annihilate personality, absofbing it in Unity.
appearances were seen as a part of the Whole·.
Time was minimized and Eternity exalted.

All individual
Thus naturally

Whether or not Par

menides derived any.thihg else from Oriental sources, it seems
quite probable that his inclination to minimize appearances in
favor of a more stable kind of basic reality was in part due to
Oriental influence.
· In what has already been said as to how the distinctions
-between Time and Eternity came to intellectual expression the
general character of the theo�y of Parmenides is already clear.
Approaching reality by beginning with an attempt"to analyse
what we mean when we say that a thing is" Parmenides reasons
that "we mean that it cannot move, change, or be divided into
or composed of many parts." (1) This, of course, involves the
assumption that Time is illusory for, if Being 1i�1··,1mmutaQle ;Time
can have no meaning.

The fact is, t'armenides made no attempt

to escape this consequence but boldly affirmed it.
1. B.G. Fuller: History of Greek Philosophy, p. 162

Thus Fuller
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writes of Parmenides's idea of Time:"Again, ·•l'ime, the real twin
brother of change, cannot logically be regarded as real.

We have

no business to speak of what was, since that implies something
which no longer is, or in other words, has gone out of existence.
It is equally impossible to speak of what will be, since that
implies that something is not as yet, but will come into existence.
1/Jhat exists is simply now, here, all at once. 11
Essentially the same theory, i.e. the contention that Eterni
ty alone is real, that �ime is illusory, comes to expression in
Zeno, the pupil of Parmenides.
Zeno 1 s method, FUller informs us (1), is that of "conceding
the reality of the Many, of Space, and ofMotion, and then - - showing (2) that the self-cont�adictions and absurdities which
follow on the concession are far greater than those involved in
the denial of their existence." Among the contradictions which
Zeno presents are the following (3).
(1) Regarding magnitude: "A (limited) magnitude must be in
finitely great and infinitely small: infinitely great, because,
being infinitely divisible, it is composed of an infinite number
of parts; infinitely small, because unextended par�s, even though
multiplied by infinity, cannot produce extension or magnitude."
(2) Regarding motion: "The line which separates

the start

ing-point of movement from its point of-rest is composed of
points, and, since the point has no extension, of an infinite num
ber of points.

Bence - - - -

even the smallest distance is in-

·finite and the stopping point can never be reached."
(3) Regarding space: "Space exists somewhere, that is, in a

r.· :.Ibid., .p.

162.
2. Italics mine.
3. Weber and Perry, Ibid., pp. 16,17.

12
space, which in turn exists in another space, and so on. 11
The second of the above arguments Zeno illustrates by the
well lmown paradoxes of Achilles and the tortoise, and the ar
row in flight.

Achilles can never overtake the tortoise be

cause however much he might gain he still must traverse half
of the remaining distance before he can enter upon the next half
and so on ad infinitum.

By the same logic he can traverse no

distance at all for any distance is infinitely divisible.

The

arrow seems to fly but being at a given point at every given
moment it must in reality be always at rest.
power:· of

The.penetrating

Zeno I s mind was bent, like the more poetic talents

of Parmenides, toward the establishment of the idea of the reali
ty of Being as eternal and only so.
Thus, the earliest Western thought in which Time and Eternity
are intellectually distinguished formulates itself in a theory in
which Time is denied and Eternity is all, that is to say, in what
we have called an �bsolutist theory.
no standing at all within reality.

Parmenides gives to Time
Time is neither an emanation,

nor a creation, nor even a secondary manifestation within reality.
It is illusion pure and simple.

To be sure, even illu&ions have,

as a more recent philosophy has recognized, some status within
the whole of things, but this is not within the comprehension of
�armenides and Zeno.

In their thought, �ime simply is not.

It is comparatively easy to point out flaws both in the methods
and in the conclusions of Parmenides and Zeno.

However, whatever

deficiencies their thought may have, it is not altogether without
significance that when the Time problem first distinctly emerges
in Western thought, it comes forth in a theory in which the whole
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emphasis is upon the reality of Eternity.

As thought begins to

sharpen its distinctions it is mastered by a powerful impression
of unchanging �eality.

c.

Idealism (1)
(I) Its Development

Parmenides•s doctrine that Time was illusory was so thor
oughly out of keeping with ordinary human experience that it was
scarcely to be expected that it should have the field of ureek
thought to itself.

T hus we find two other theories of Time, name

ly, an idealism which recognizes that both Eternity and Time are
real and a materialism which holds that Time is real but that
Eternity is not.

The root ideas of both theories were already

present in the days of Parmenides.

Without attempting to give

any specific accounts of the ideas of Time of the earlier writers
we shall indicate in a broad way the development of the thought
tendencies that issued in the idealistic theory.,. -.
(A) During the lifetime.of Parmenides (2) the Pytha
goreans, who traced their intellectual ancestry farther back than
the days of Parmenides, were a�tempting to trace reality back to
numerical principles and ultimately to Idea.

Their conclusions

were in agreement with Parmen1des in that they thought that all
things reduced themselves to Unity; but their recognition of the
reality of number was in opposition to the Eleatic attempt to
deny all save pure Being.

Their own theory allows no place for

1. It must be noted that the term lliealism is used, in a general
way, not in the sense of modern epistemological idealism but in
the sense of Platonic ontological :1,dealism, and that specifically
the term is used in this paper to indicate a theory of Time
which we have elsewhere defined.
2. Ibid., ch. 24.
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a real Time.

Its emphasis upon numbers is an important step in

the direction of the breaking of the Eleatic thought of the sole
reality of Being and the establishment of the reality of Ideas
in which diversity as well as unity must be recognized.
(B) Heraclitus, an older contemporary of Parmenides,
taught a theory almost opposite to that of Parmenides.
he said,

8hange,

instead of being illusory, was almost literally the

sole reality.

Indeed, Being was itself an illusion. (1)

was in perpetual flow.

All

The only things that remained constant

were the principles upon which change takes place; all else was
in ceaseless motion.

Thus from a second_source the .principle of

diversity received emphasis.
(C) The conflict that grew out of the clash between Par
menides•s philosophy of Being and Heraclitus's philosophy of be
coming led to the development of a type of theory which tried to
reconcile the hostile theories by a view which, in.stead of ex
piaining reality in terms of a si�le principle which must be
either Being or Becoming, presented the idea of a duality of
principles\ which in the�·-·· interaction produced change.
Empedocles (450 B.C.) (2) held that there were four elements:
fire, air, earth, and water.
themselves.

These elements were immutable in·

However, they were mixed and separated in the var

ious proportions that make up the universe of substances and
events according to the immaterial principles of Love and Hate.
Anaxagoras proceeds in a simular manner.

Instead of four

substances there are an infinite number and instead of. princi
ples of Love and Hate there is a NOUS which brings about the
1. Ibid., p. 19.
2. Ibid., p. 27.

lffi
changes in the reiationships of things.

However, material sub

stances are still wrought upon by an immaterial principle.
Thus the speculations of Empedocles and Anaxagoras, influenced
on the one side by the Eleatics and on the other by Heraclitus,
·represent a dualistic reconciliation of the conflicting ideas of
Being and Becoming.

In this they pave the way for the idealistic

recogni,tion of the reality both of Eternity and of Time.
(D) Altogether apart from the development of the metaphysi
cal systems of which we have be.en speaking, there was between
the days of Parmenides and those of Plato a shift in the whole
point of view of Greek philosophy that was of far reaching im
portance.

Up to the time of Parmenides the effort had been made

to explain reality in terms of perceivable substances such as
water, earth, air, and fire.

Even Parmenides tended.to think of

�eing in terms of a perfect sphere.

However, through various

influences, including the writings of Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and
a number of skeptics, and culminating in the teaching of Socrates,
philosophy c_ame much more to take its cue from the moral and spir
itual nature of man.

Philosophy was still not subjective: the

concern was yet with that which could be objectified.

However,

ideas and ideals, as well as perceivable objects, were more ful
ly introduced as explanatory and controlling principles.

Being

was no longer defined either in.physical or negative terms but
in terms of the spiritual and positive concepts.
Th.us out of various tendencies there emerged the theory that
Eternity is a changelessness that belo�gs to cerltain ideal princi
ples and that Time, though only an imperfect product of Eternity,
shares some of the regularity of Eternity.

This theory finds its
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classic expression in Plato and, as we shall presently see, a not
very different expression in Aristotle.
(II) lts Expression in Plato.
In Plato's thought, as found both in the general direction
of his thinking and in that passage in the Timaeus

which he de

votes especially to the Time problem, all of the essential feat
ures of what we have called the idealist theory of
of Time and Eternity to reality came to expression.

the relation
Plato is in

deed the typical representative of this type of theory.
(A) A recognition of the Reality of Both Eternity and Time
Emerson has remarked that Plato was a "balanced soul", hold
ing that in Plato the concepts of identity and difference, the one
and the many, were combined successfully.

It is this aspect of

Plato 1 s thought which marks the advance of his theory of Time
over that of the Eleatics,on the one hand, and of Heraclitus, on
the other.

Plato adopted both the concept of the reality of un

changing Being and the concept of constant change among things.
Thus Plato's Ideas, though independent in themselves, are in thing�.
Plato insisted on the. abiding character of Goodness, Truth, and
Beauty, and yet at the same time held that these Ideas penetrate
a realm of temporality.

When Plato came specifically to deal

with the Time problem he placed his discussion within the frame
of a concept of a temporal order which is made after an eternal
pattern. (1)

He never doubted that there is both an order of

reality which e?(ists in a state of changelessness as Eternity,
1.

Plato: Timaeus, Translated by Jowett, p. 37 ff.
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and an order of reality which exists in a state of constant change
as Time.

He saw clearly that both must be seriously reckoned with.
(B) Eternity Consi�ting in Intelligible Being

Whereas the Eleatics had found Eternity to consist primarily
in Being in which no distinction was made between spirit and mat
ter or between idea and thing, Plato found Eternity to consist
Plato regarded the creator

primarily in "intelligible being". (1)

as eternal and not infrequently spoke of the spiritual God rather
than of the intelligible ideas aa ultimate.

However, the more

distinctive side of Plato's thought was his insistence upon the
eternity of the "intelligible ideastl.

Thus) while there is in

Plato's thought the idea of an eternal God, the distinctive thought
of Platonism is the idea of eternal intelligible idea.
(C) Eternity as a State of uTimelessness"
Since in Plato's thought intelligible ideas were eternal, it
was not surprising that Eternity was for Plato not simply a state
of endless duration or even of freedom from a definite time order,
but rather a state of complete timelessness.

Thus Plato writes:

"We say indeed that he was, he is, and he will be, but the truth:
is that 'he is' alone truly expresses him, and that· •was' and
'will be' are only to be spoken of generation in Time ••·•• that
which is immovably the same cannot become older or younger by
time, nor ever did or has become, or hereafter will be older,
nor is subject at all to any of those states of generation which
attach to the movements of sensible things." (2)
(D) Time a Product of Eternity
Throughout Plato's writings it is evident that both the
force and the pattern which produces temporal retlity is resident
1. Ibid., p. 37.
2. Ibid., p. 38.
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in Eternity, that in some sense Eternity produces Time.

This is

particularly evident in Plato's account in the Timaeus of the
creation.

Thus Plato writes:

11

'fhere were no days and nights

and months and years before the heaven was created, but when
He created the heaven He created them also." (1)

Again Plato

aeclares: "When the Father and creator saw the image that He had
made of the eternal gods moving and -living, He was delighted,
and in His joy determined to make His work still more like the
pattern'' •••••••• He resolved to make a moving image of Eternity,
and as He set in order the heaven He made this eternal image
having a motion according to number, while Eternity rested in
unity; and this is what we·call Time.(2)
It is clear enough that in Plato's thought the forces which
produced Time are eternal and that the patterns after which it
was created are eternal.

However, the question as to how Time

was created remains obscure in Plato's thought.

To begin with,

it is uncertain whether Plato intends that we should think of
an actual Creator or.whether Plato is in the term Creator simply personifying the creative forces that he believes to be re
sident in the Ideas themselves.

We are unable to resolve the

question, although we may remark that the latter -u:.:hew,-rs more in
keeping with the more distinctive idealistic side of Plato with
which we are primarily concerning ourselves here.

Beyond thisJ
.
it is not immediately evident whether Plato intends that we

should think of a real b�ginning of Time or whether he is speak
ing in a figure of a process of continuous generation r
question requires special consideration.
1 • Ibid. , p • 3 7.
2. Ibid •.

This
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It is scarcely conceivable that so shrewd a writer as Plato
should have committed the logical blunder of affirming that there
was a time before before and after existed.

such an affirmation

implies, as Aristotle shows, a contradiction in terms, for the
phrase before time

depends upon the very concept which

it seeks

to deny; Plato's idea judged in the light of its true purpose
does not involve such a contradiction.
The intent of Plato's idea of the beginning of Time is to
indicate the logical priority of Eternity to Time.

There is in

deed in Plato's thought a confused state which can neither be
said to be Time nor Eternity but only uncertain possibility.
Plato's whole _concept of matter indicates this.

It refers to

that in which no distinctions,not even before and after, have
any meaning.

Moreover, Plato's language in discussing the

creation seems to indicate the possibility of a motion prior to
ordered Time. (1)

Plato considers it quite unnecessary to show

the logical priority of Eternity to this, since confusion is to
him negation.

However, over against confused possibility is an

ordered Time which impresses Plato with its regularity.

Plato

considers it appropriate to illustrate the logical priority of
Eternity to this Time and accordingly presents the idea of the
beginning of Time.

Thus in Platonism there may be said to be a

time when distinguished before and after began to have a definite
expression in ordered motion, though their indefinite possibility
may

have had no origin.
(E) Time Regular and Real
Although Time is a product of Eternity, it possesses,for

Plato,

a reality of its own.

1. Plato: Ibid., p. 525.

Time is, in his thought, by no
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means the illusion that it is in Eleatic thought.

Instead, it

has a regularity such as no illusion possesses and by virtue of
this regularity and order is more nearly akin to eternal reality
than aught else that has been created.
Plato writes:

11 VV'h

en the Father and creator saw the image

that He h�d__ made _of the eternal gods moving and living, He was
delighted, and,in His joy, determined to make His work still
more like the pattern; and as the pattern was an eternal creature,
so He sought to make the universe the same as far as might be.
Now the nature of intelligible being is eternal , and to bestow
eternity on the creature was wholly impossible.

But He resolved

to make a moving image of Eternity, and as Ha set in order the
heaven He made this eternal image having a motion according to
number, while eternity rested in unity; and this is what we call
time". ( 1)

It is ruime which imparts to the heavens their highest

perfection.

Thus, the temporal movement of the stars rounds out

the universe:

11

The perfect number of·,Time completes the perfect

year when all eight revolutions, having their relative degrees of
swiftness, are accomplished together and again meet at the original
point of departure, measured by the circle of the same moving
equally." ( 2)

Time is for Plato no mere illusion but an order

and a regularity which cannot be relegated to the realm of the
subjective.

We have remarked that it is somewhat uncertain

whether Plato meant by the creation of Time a continuing process
or a definite act by which Time became

a self sufficient reality.

However, in either case this much is quite clear, that•Time as
produced by eternal realities which are, in Plato, logically
1•
2.

Ibid • , p • 37 •
Ibid., p. 39.
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prior to all finite minds must always be taken by finite minds as
objective reality which they meet,not as a subjective entity which
they produce.

The idealism of Plato is an objective idealism and

the Time which comes out of the Ideas and most nearly expresses
them is an objective Time.
(F) Time a Means of Knowledge of Eternity
As a regular and objective product of Eternity,Time, in the
thought of Plato, not only does not obscure Eternity but reveals
Eternity and leads toward the contemplation of eternal realities.
Consider, for example, the following passage from the Timaeus:
"The sight in my opinion is the source of the greatest benefit
to us, for had the eyes never seen the stars and the sun, and the
heaven, none of the words which we have spoken about the universe
would have been uttered.

But now the sight of day and night, and

the revolution of the months have given us the· invention of number,
and a conception of time, and the power of inquiring· about the
nature of the whole; and from this source we have derived philoso
phy, than which no greater good was or will be given by the gods
to mortal man •••••••• This much let us say, that God invented and
gave us sight to this end, that we might behold the courses of
intelligence in the heaven, and apply them to the courses of our
own intelligence which are kin to them, the unperturbed to the
perturbed; and that we, learning theni and being partakers of the
true computations of nature, might imitate the absolutely unerring
courses of God and regulate our own vagaries."{l)
(III) Its Expression in Aristotle
The philosophy of Aristotle is not generally called ideal
istic and cannot as a whole be characterized by that term. Indeed,
l. Ibid., p.47.
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as we shall see, it contains features which fall outside even
our snecial use of the term idealism.

However, the theory of the

relation of Time and Eternity to reality which Aristotle present
ed, despite some real differences from the theory of Plato, falls
in the main within the bounds of the theory which we have called
idealistic.
(A) Aristotle does not begin as does Plato with eternal self
sufficient Ideas.
terest in Eternity.

Nor does Aristotle have the same absorbing in
Aristotle 1 s first concern is for actually

existing sensible reality.

Eternal principles are introduced

not for their own sakes but because they are needed for the ex
planation of existing reality.

However, the fact is clear that

Aristotle, like Plato, is firmly convinced of the reality of
changelessness. (l)
( B) Aristotle I s conception of the nature of that 'Nhich is
eternal is somewhat different from Plato 1 s.

Plato, as we have

indicated, had thought of Eternity as consisting primarily of
eternal changeless Ideas, and though he often spoke of a creator,
the idealistic side of his thought continued to present Eternity in
terms of Ideas which are essentially static.
(2) of them.

Objects only "partake"

Aristotle introduced considerably more of a dynamic

element into the essential character of his first principle . He
combined> in thought of a first principle, something of' what Plato
meant by Idea and something of what he meant by God.

Thus Aris

totle traces all reality back to a First Mover, or a First cause.
The terms in themselves indicate something of a dyn8.Il}ic principle.
A cause cannot as a cause be purely static.

As the beginning

of the series of movements a First Mover cannot be an altogether
sta tic principle whatever protests Aristotle may make.
1. W.D. Ross: Aristotle, PP• 90-93.
2. Weber and Perry: Ibid., P• 62.
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However, in the intent of Aristotle the content of Eternity
is not so different than in the thought of Plato.

Thus Aristotle

points out that Eternity includes necessary truths which for him
are essentially static.

What is more important, Aristotle in

sists that the First Mover is unmoved, that He brings about crea
tion without being affected, much as an object of desire or ad
miration may affect an observer without itself being affected.
However much Aristotle's principles may suggest a more dynamic
idea of eternal realities, Aristotle evidently intended, like
Plato, to present Eternity as

somewnat ,· of a static nature.

{C) Aristotle was far morg preoccupied with the temporal
than was Plato.

It is, accordingly,

not surprising that Aris

totle differed with Plato regarding the problem of the beginning
of Time. Instead of speaking of a beginning of Time, Aristotle
argued that Time had no beginning. (1)

He held that the very

notion of a beginning of Time was a contradiction in terms, since
it was the nature of Time to be continuous,and since it was of
the nature of every movement to be bounded by a past and a futur�
the idea of Time as other than infinite in extent was to Aristotle
not thinkable.
However, once again the contrast, while real, is not as deep
as it appears.

It must be remembered that Plato did not assign

a beginning to temporality itself but only to ordered regular
Tim� and that even so his intention was primarily rather to point
out the logical priority of Eternity - a point which Aristotle
would not have disputed - and may not refer to a literal begin
ning at all.

Further - and this is the principal fact here -

there can be no doubt that Aristotle., like .Plato., considered Time ( 2)
1� �bid., p� 84.
2. Ibid., p. 93 ff.
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to be a product of Eternity.
Whatever may be the differences between Aristotle and Plato
as to center of interest or problem of beginning, it is quite
clear that for both writers Eternity is real and Time·is in some
sense generated by Eternity.

In both writers the manner in

which Time is generated is somewhat obscure, but in both the man
nerof the production of Time is such as to be in no way incon
sistent with the independence of eternal principles.
(D) When we come to look at the view of Aristotle alongside
that of Plato with respect· to the idea that Time shares in the
reality of Eternity, the situation is not quite as we should ex
pect, from what we have seen so far of Aristotle's theory.

As

Aristotle considered the relation betwe·en Eternity and temporal
existence he was impressed with the reality of the temporal more
than was Plato.

But when Aristotle considered.the relation be

tween Time itself and temporal existences he was impressed with
the reality of Time less than was Plato.

Indeed the fact is that

whereas _Plato never doubted that Time was real, Aristotle only with
considerable hesitancy ascribed reality to Time.

Thus, for ex

ample, Chapter X of book IV of the Bliysics is introduced by a
presentation of certain considerations which "might make one sus
pect either that there is really no such thing as Time, or at
least that it has only an equivocal and obscure existence. 11
The forms in which Aristotle's suspicions

(

1)

of the reality

are nresented are three: a. His analysis of the intermal structure,
b. His concept of the relation of Time to m,otion, and p. His idea
of the speculative possibility that Time may depend upon mind.
a. Whereas Plato looking at Time as a whole had found
1: Aristotle: Physics, Book IV, Chapter 10, in Loeb 1 s Classical
�rary, p. 3?3 •.
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it regular and real,

Aristotle looking at the structure of Time

and finding it not subject to sensible apprehension suspected
its reality.

Thus Aristotle suggested in opposition to the idea

of the reality of'Time that Time is made up of the "no-longer
and the not-yet" (1), that its parts having no extent cannot
together make up a whole reality, and that its essential element,
the�, is paradoxical in that it seems to be both the same and
changing. ( 2)
b. Again, whereas Plato had been content to suggest that
Time and motion arose together, Aristotle made Time quite depend
ent unon motion, insisting that Time is the" 1 number of movement
in respect of before and after 111 (3) because "we discriminate ••••
•• the more and the less of movement by Time11 .(4)

Thus in Aris

totle Time seems to be reduced to the status of a sort of an
appendix to movement.
c. Whereas, for Plato, Time derived its existence directly
from Eternity, Aristotle toyed with the speculative possibility
that

Time was dependent on mind or that there would be no Time

if there were no soul.(5)
When this account of the possible unreality of T�me is con
sidered in the general background
impressions emerge.

of Aristotle's teachings1 two

On the one hand,it is clear that Aristotle

was far less willing to ascribe a large and unequivocal place in
reality to Time than was Plato.

The latter had thought that

Time was a mighty frame of all created reality in v1hich all events
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Ibid., p. 373.
Ibid., P• 375.
Ross: Ibid., p. 90.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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and all finite minds must have their place.
a ground of created existence.

Time was a sort of

Aristotle, however, made Time

not a frame or ground of existence, but only a number of motion.
Time was not the prerequisite of events, but only a sort of a
rule which might be placedalongside events.

At best it was a

highly intangible rule and one which might pass out of exist
ence altogether if mind were no longer there.
On the other hand, a second impression which is inherent
even in Aristotle's objections to the reality of Time must not
be lost sight of, namely, that Aristotle, in spite of suggestions
oooosing the idea of the reality of Time,continued to ascribe to
Time a genuine place in reality.
fact to be dealt with.

He considered that Time is a

He gave it the status not of a mere

phase of motion, but as distinct from motion, declaring that
whereas there were many motions there was only one Time. (1)
Again, even his suggestion that Time might cease if mind ceased
is far short of the idea that mind creates Time, and at very most
is advanced exceedingly cautiously, as Ross says, as a question
which is never answered.(2)

As a measure Time might disappear

with mind, but as a measurable aspect it still
ity.

belongs to real

Aristotle refrains from the specific suggestion that ·Time

is a product of our minds, and his positive treatment of the sub
ject rules out the thought that he intended to exclude Time al
together from the sphere of reality.
we may now sum up the position of Aristotle.

Aristotle

softened the severity of Plato's insistence that eternal Ideas
1. Ibid. , ;P_•. 89-. . , - .
2. Ibid., pp. 90� 91.
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were the essence of reality.

By implication

he introduced

somewhat more of a dynamic element into his idea of that which
is the source of all things.

At the same time, he continued to

believe that Eternity stood for something real.

The Pure Form

and First Cause of Aristotle's thought was not so essential a
nart of Aristotle's system as the Ideas of Plato 1 s thought
were of his system; but the eternal Pure Form and First Cause
of Aristotle's thought was considered to be real.
In like manner,Aristotle was far less disposed than was
Plato to ascribe objective reality to Time.
of motion.

Time was a number

FUrther, several special facts suggested to him

the possibility that Time was either unreal or only partly real.
However, he continued to think of Time as something distinct
from motion and distinct from mind.

He considered it a subor

dinate aspect of reality , but still an aspect of reality.
D. Democritus and Materialism
(I) Development of the Theory
we have now seen how the discovery of the distinction be
tween Time and Eternity arose with a theory which undertook a
denial of the reality of Time, and how in the course of the
years there developed a theory which embodied the chief affirma
tion of this theory without adopting its extreme denial.

We are

now to see that some of the same influen·ces which issued in the
theory which attempted to affirm the reality of both Eternity
and Time were worked out along another line in a theory which
affirmed the reality of Time but denied the reality of Eternity.
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Heraclitus's emphasis upon the fact of change was not a
systematic attempt to deny all permanence, but an affirmation
of the reality of change and a protest against too easy attempts
to discover the essence of reality.

As this trend was combined

with the Eleatic thought in Empedocles and Anaxagoras, it was
worked out in theories which tried to preserve both permanence
and change through the recognition of the coexistence of mater
ial particles and vital principles.

Change was supposed to be

the result of the action of the latter upon the former.

However,

the vital principles were never clearly defined (1), while the
material particles seemed to be quite tangible.

Thus it occur-

red to certain writers that perhaps the material particles were the
only realities, thus excluding the eternal Ideas of Plato.
(II) The Theory
The leading features of Greek materialism, of which Democri
tus was the chief representative, may be briefly put somewhat as
follows:

The universe consists essentially of particles that can

not be divided although they have size and weight.

These particles

are alike in quality but differ in quantity and in shape.

They

are endowed with a force of their own by virtue of which they move
everlastingly downward with a whirling motion.
ture come together to form bodies.

Atoms of like tex

Souls consist of groups of

smooth atoms which have come together in such a way as to make
sensation possible.

All souls, even those of the gods, are ul

timately dissolved so that while the atoms persist, individuality
comes to an end. (2)
1. Weber and Perry, Ibid., p. 34.
2. Cf. Ibid., pp. 35-39, also Robin: Greek Thought, pp. 112-121.
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From this sketch it is quite apparent, in the first place,
that the atomists reduced the idea of Eternity to a minimum.

It

cannot strictly be said that they got rid of the notion of Eterni
ty altogether, for the atoms were supposed to remain unaltered.
However, the atoms themselves were in a constant flux of changing
relations which ca.me about almost by chance.

Moreover, whatever

eternal qualities they may have had were of li:ttle significance.
All that they possessed was body and a whirling downward motion
in relation to which all thought, beauty, or goodness, all ·, , :· •
ideas:

· were only accidents that ca.rne and went with the shifting

movements of atoms.
nated,

Although the idea of Eternity was not elimi

it was reduced to such a bare minimum that it had little

remaining significance.
In the second place, it is reasonably clear that the atomists
tho_ught of Time as quite real.

To be sure they did not seem to

have a definite conception of a perfectly ordered Time.

However,

it is reasonably clear that what was implied in the concept of
a continuous endless downward motion was Time.

such a motion as

the .atomists presented can scarcely be described apart from an
idea of Time implied or expressed.

Without developing the idea

of Time the atomists described a motion in Time.
Essentially the atomists 1 theory was one in which Time was
the pattern of events.

For them it meant little to say that a

thing was in Eternity.

A thing could only be in Time.

Time was

real; Eternity was unimportant and scarcely real.
E- Later Greek Thought
Greek thought after Plato and Aristotle produced little that
was new regarding the relation of Time and Eternity to reality.
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Thought was taken up either with carrying on the metaphysical
ideas of the systematists or with developing systems that were
essentially moral rather than metaphysical.

We may follow

briefly the course of the major types of theory which grew out
of the systems of Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, and Democritus,
res9ectively, in later Greek thought.
(I) Absolutism
As we shall presently show, the thought of Plotinus rela
tive to our problem retains a Platonic flavor.

Although Eterni

ty is magnified and Time reduced, Time continues to have some
place in reality.

However, there is enough of the tendency to

find Eternity everywhere while brushing Time aside to warrant
some discussion of the views of Plotinus in connection with the
absolutist theory.

Especially is this true when the tremendous

influence of Plotinus upon subsequent absolutism is remembered.
Plotinus was disposed to make all ultimate reality, or the
One, eternal.

To be sure, strictly speaking, the One was beyond

all distinctions, even beyond the distinction between Time and
Eternity, but actually Plotinus•s system suggests the idea of
the Eternity of the One.

Indeed, if among other distinctions

the distinction between before and after

disappears in the One,

it is scarcely possible to avoid the conclusion th�t the One is
essentially eternal.

At the same time, it must not be forgotten

that the state of the One is never thought of as completely des
cribed by the word Eternity.

There is something more of the vi

tal, the experimental and the religious in the Eterni.ty of Plo
tinus than in the Eternity of Parmenides.

Eternity is not the
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exact state of that which logic alone demands, but a partial and
inadequate account of that which experience attains at the end of
a painful and laborious process involving not only logic but mys
ticism.
Naturally such a system as that of Plotinus would tend to
remove Time from the sphere of that which is ultimately real.

Just

how far Plotinus went in this direction it is difficult to say.
But, since he regarded even intelligible ideas as nothing more
than emanations of reality, it is fairly clear that he thought of
Time as less real than did Plato.
yet not more than an

Time was a·part of reality,

emanation from the ultimate reality, an

emanation that was at least twice removed from that reality.

It

was more than an illusion, yet far short of final reality.
(II) Idealism
(A) The Platonic Type
1 . The Platonic tra�ition was carried on with some modifica
tions for several centuries in the Academy in Athens.

Thus we

find Speusippus, while maintaining the essentials of the Platonic
system, introducing the principle of emanation and so throwing
some light upon our problem. (1)
2. The really significant development of the Platonic prin
ciples is in the writer of whom we have just been speaking in con
nection with another school, Plotinus of Lycopolis.
It has already been made sufficiently clear that, like Plato,
Plotinus considered that ultimate reality was eternal, but con
tinued to find a subordinate place in reality for Tinte.

rt has

further been shown that Plotinus went beyond Plato in a absolutist
1. Weber and Perry: Ibid., p. 77.
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direction by making the place given
did the latter.

to Time less important than

However, apart from this, Plotinus departed

from Plato 1 s thought upon our problem, along

idealist lines, in

several important ways.
a. Plato had spoken of Time as being created by Eternity.
reality was in some sense a product of eternal Will.

Its

Even if the

idea of creation represents only a sort of a figurative terminology
in Plato; the connection between Eternity and Time is not apparent
ly entirely necessary.

However, Plotinus explains the production

of all that is temporal in terms of emanation from the One.
sure, he insists that emanation is never to be explained.

To be
It is

neither creation, nor derivation, nor identity, nor gleaming as
of light. (1)

It is like the One, a miracle. (2)

But even so,

despite Plotinus's insistence on the indefiniteness of emanation,
it is clear that emanation is to be distinguished from creation
and that it implies a necessity of relation such as is not suggest
ed in Plato's thought.

Thus, the reality of Plotinusts Time,

though it be farther removed from ultimate reality than is that of
Plato's Time, is connected by greater necessity to ultimate reality
Time in Plato's thought stands high

than is that of Plato I s Time.

er in the hierarchy of the reality of created existence, but the
whole existing world, in Plotinus 1 s thought, stands related to
ultimate reality by a stronger principle of necessity.
b. By connecting the idea of Time rather more closely to the
idea of the world soul than did Plato, Plotinus int.reduced some
w hat more of a subjectivist element into his conceptfon of the
reality of Time than did Plato.
ground of created existence.
l.Ibid., p. 132.
2.Ibid.

For Plato, Time was a primary

Plotinus held that Time existed by
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nature (1) as 11 the form which the soul ( i.e., the world soul)
creates for itself when it desires to reproduce the eternal ideas
as living creatures. 11

It will be at once seen that the unques

tioned objectivity which Plato assigned to Time is softened down
and Time becomes in some degree dependent upon soul.

It should

be noted, however, that since the soul which apprehends in terms
of Time is the world soul, Time still does not lose all of its
objectivity.
c. Plotinus included considerably more in his concept of
Eternity than did Plato.
belong to Eternity.

Plato held that God and general ideas

Plotinus added the idea that intelligible

concepts of individuals, in so far as they are parts of the uni
fied whole, were likewise eternal, so that in this sense all that
comes to be in Time is in idea included in Eternity.

This thought

which originated shortly after the time of Plato himself, and was
emphasized by Plotinus, contributed toward the significantly
Medieval inclination to view reality as essentially static.

It

doubtless played a large part in the development of the idea of
predestination which grew up in the church, the idea that events
are fixed beforehand,not simply by an unbroken chain of causation)
but by
d.

11

divine decree".
Finally,' Plotinus clarified somewhat the idea of the be

ginning of Time which Plato had left somewhat indefinite.

Plo

tinus taught that the beginning of Time did not mean, as Aristotle
had interpreted Plato to mean, that there was a time when there
was no Time.

Indeed, the

"in the vulgar sense". (2)

11

time-series 11 may be said to be eternal
Time's beginning consists rather in

1. W.R. Inge: The Philosophy of Plotinus, p. 171.
2. Ibid.
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the logical priority of spiritual movement to "the movement which
takes place in time". (1)
(B) The Aristotelian Type
The tradition of Aristotle was carried forward in the Lyceum
or school of the Peripatetics at Athens.

Under the leadership of

Theophrastus and Straton the school leaned toward an emphasis on
the sensualistic side of Aristotle's thought. (2)

Later, possibly

as a result of this emphasis, a decided skepticism appeared in
the Aristotelian school under the influence of carneades and others.(3)
We shall have more to say in another place of the influence of
later Greek skepticism upon thought regarding Time.
{C) stoicism
The philosophy of the Stoics as primarily a moral emphasis has
some affinity for each of the theories of Time which had been pre
sented up to the time of its emergence.

stoicism's disparagement

of the joys and sorrows of daily life is akin to the Platonic
emnhasis upon Idea.

At the same time, stoicism's attempt to link

soul and body in a single concept and its failure to present a
clear idea of Eternity mark a certain kinship between stoicism and
m�terialism.

In its theory of the reality of Time and Eternity

Stoicism belongs formally to the materialist type of theory.

Its

concern seems to have been primarily with that which goes on and
on endlessly. (4} (5)

However, really its thought should probably

be classed with the other idealists, for despite the fact that it
seems to have had no clear idea of that which was independent of
Time, as contrasted with that which goes on and on, it 'did empha1 �.
2.
3.
4.
5.

:Ibid.
Robin: Ibid., p. 309.
Weber and perry: Ibid., p. 114.
Marcus Aurelius: Meditations, IV, Paragraph 43.
Ibid ., Paragraph �o.

35
size laws of nature and life which should be thought of as lJ:te rnal.
Practically , tts •· thought comes to mean that eternal principles
pervade endless Time.
Probably the chief cont�ibution of the stoics to thought
upon the Time problem was its adding to the idealism of Plato and
Aristotle a :i'uwther .. , ,. moral earnestness.

The fleeting moment

had no significance with respect to its passing feelings but in
its moral demands and possibilities it was somehow linked with
Eternity.
(III) Materialism
(A) The materialist theory of Time, as the denial of Eternity J
was carried forward especially in the Epicurean school.

V'lhile Epi

cureanism is essentially a moral philosophy, its adoption of the
atomist metaphysic is sufficiently well known to require no parti
cular comment.

Disregarding the idea of Eternity, ·Epicureanism

adds to the a.tomist theory the thought that one ought to live so as
to gain

as much of pleasure as possible in the moments that he has.

Thus,where the stoic has found the chief significance of the moment
in its moral import and so linked it with Eternity, the Epicurean
has found the primary importance of the moment in its possibility
for pleasure and so cut it off from all save itself.
(B) The materialist position is presented in its classical form
in the Roman world in Lucretius's classical poem De Natura Rerum, in
which the universe was pie tured as the result of the fortuitous fal·l
ing of atoms through infinite time.

Lucretius advocated the charact

eristi� materialist denial of the reality of Eternity and affirma
tion of the importance of Time as a constituent of the universe.
"Not of design did primal elements
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Find each their place as •twere with forethought keen,
Nor bargained what their movements were to be;
But since the atom host in many ways
Smitten by blows for infinite ages back,
And by their weight impelled, have coursed along,
Have joined all ways and made full test of all
The types which mutual uhions could create,
Therefore it is through great Time dispersed,
With every kind of blend and motion tried,
They meet at length in momentary groups
Which oft prove rudiments of mighty things Of earth and sea and sky and living breeds." (1)
(IV} The FUnction of Greek Skepticism
We must not pass from our account of the major types of
Greek thought without some mention of skepticism.

we have al

ready indicated the place of skepticism in the development of
the thought of Plato.
more far reaching.

However, the influence of skepticism is

Despite Greek skepticism's destructiveness

it has �t each stage served a useful purpose in bringing out the
defects of the current theories of Time.

Thus such writers as

Gorgias reduced the one sided theory of Parmenides to absurdity,
while Phyrro, Carneades, and others showed difficulties involved
in every attempt to construct a purely rational theory of Time.
Beyond this we may affirm that.it was the out cropjing of an
attitude closely akin to Greek s kepticism and doubtless more or

.

less directly influenced by it that cleared the way in the thought
of the early philosophers of the modern era for the discovery of
those ideas that issued in what we have called the spiritualist
l.Lucretius: De Natura Rerum, Translated by J.W. Duff, in outline
of Great Books.
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theory of Time.
III. The Middle Ages
The thought of the Middle Ages contributed little that was
new toward the solution of the problem of the relation of Time
and Eternity to reality.

However, attention may be called to

three significant facts regarding Medieval thought with refer
ence to the subject:

first, that the idealist and realist tra

ditions dominated the field while absolutism continued to find
some advocates and materialism dronned out of sight; second, that
there was a gradual movement away from the type of idealistic
theory represented in Christian Platonism toward a non-idealist
third, that certain interpreta

ic nominalism and skepticism;

tions and modifications were introduced into the idealistic and
absolutist theories.

We now present a sketch illustrating brief

ly the above facts and calling attention to a few outstanding re
nresentatives of the theories which find expression in Medieval
thought.
A.

The Idealist Apnroach
(I)

The Platonic Type

When the Christian religion came to occupy a position of pro
minence in the Roman world it found expedient the development of
a philosophical background.

Not unnaturally it turned first to

Nee-Platonism as a congenial system which shared its high belief in
transcendence and at the same time its idea of the possibility of
union with the Divine.

Thus, in Saint Augustine, who came into

Christianity from a Nee-Platonic background, we find the first re
presentative Christian theory of Time, a modified Platonism.
Although Augustine's ideas of faith, church, and dogma have

38

no

precise counterpart in the theory of Plato, his theory of

Time is in the main a reaffirmation of the Platonic theory.

Like

Plato Augustine believed that God was beyond Time, the unchangeable
Author of change. (1)

Like Plato he assigned to Time a beginning

simultaneous with that of motion.

However, Augustine offered the

explanation that the beginning of Time must not be taken to mean
a beginning in Time, for Eternity does not mean duration and what
existed before Time was not an extent but an eternal simultaneity.(2)
Augustine's real advance over Plato, however, was his emphasis
upon the place of will both in Eternity and in Time.

The origin

of the world and of Time, he held:, was not, as Pl�tinus had said,
an emanation.

Rather it was a creation, a free act of God.

Where

as Plato found the essential character of the Eternity, which stands
over against Time as its antithe·sis and source, in ideas,
found it in the freedom of God.
presently

see,

In

Augustine

modern times, as we shall

the shift to the volitional basis has had a revolu

tionary effect upon the whole_ concept of Time.

However, during

the Middle Ages it never became sufficiently dominant to neti_a�ide
the idealistic conception.
(II) The Aristotelian Type
For eight hundred years after the death of Augustine, Euro
pean thought continued to be largely under the influence of the
Platonic tradition.

However, in the thirteenth century the··Aris

totelian tradition began to make itself felt more pointedly (3)
so that by the middle of the fifteenth century it had become the
official philosophy of the church(4).

Thus a view of Time which,

While still of what we have called the idealist type, was quite
1.
2.
3.
4.

Weber and Perry: Ibid., p. 146.
Ibid., P• 147.
Ibid.
Ibid.

39

different from that of Augustine, came into Medieval thought as
a development of the Aristotelian tradition.
The classical expression of Medieval Aristotelianism was of
course the writings of Thomas of Acquin.

As a disciple of Aris-

totle Thomas adopted the doctrines of the reality of Eternity
and of Time.

However, as a Christian theologian he was obliged

to introduce modifications.

For one thing, the special Aristo

telian doctrine of the infinity of Time had to be modified.

The

doctrine of creation was too vital a part of the Christian faith
to be thrust aside.

Thus, Thomas acknowledged that world and

Time were indeed created at a definite moment. (1)

At the same

time, in an attempt to soften the difference between this doc
trine and the teachings of Aristotle, Thomas contended that the
doctrine of creation was a tenet of faith that could not be as
certained or established by reason.

Further, the idea of a

world infinite in Time was, st. Thomas held, rationally conceiva
ble, even in a Christian system;

for, on the one hand, the idea

of creation from nothing did not necessarily mean that creation
was temporally preceeded by nothing, and, on the other hand, the
idea of an infinite Time stretch did not make the world like God,
for however durable the world might be it was still subject to
change.
More important is the fact that as a Christian teacher
Thomas could no longer hold on to a purely formal concept of the
First Mover.

The very fact of the acceptance of a Christian idea

of God meant that by implication

at least

the ground of the

universe was no longer purely eternal or unmoved.

God, if He

1. ueberweg: A History of Philosophy, Volume I, p. 448.
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is at all, is Spirit and Life and not mere motionlessness.

Thus,

whether avowedly or not, the place given to Eternity becomes some
what smaller.

As in Augustine, though less noticeably,� finds

some place in reality.

Spiritualism begins to gain a firm hold

unon thought.
The course of the Aristotelian domination of European thought
was not uniform.

The first part of the period was devoted to what

was called a realistic

interpretation of Aristotle (i.e.,

sals were thought to be real).

univer

However, as time moved on, what

was called a nominalistic interpretation began to prevail (i.e.,
universals were thought to be only names for universals which had
no real existence).

st. Thomas had stood about midway between

these two, holding that universals exist in things.

However, after

the days of Thomas the nominalistic interpretation came more and
more to prevail.

Churchmen no longer pelieved that general con

cepts had a real existence of their own.

This meant that there was

less and less confidence in the power of reason.

The emphasis

upon reason was replaced in Duns scotus by an emphasis upon will,
and an emphasis upon will means a distrust of all intellectual
concepts including the concepts of Time and 'of Eternity.
in Occam nominalism became fully expressive.
be the way to knowledge.

Finally,

Faith was held to

Skepticism reigned in philosophy.

Thus,

along with all other metaphysical ideas, all theories of Time
tended to be placed

under the shadow of doubt.

The way was paved

for a new metaphysics and a new theory of Time.
B. Absolutism
Despite general Medieval acceptance of the Aristotelian and
Platonic types of idealist theory of Time, the absolutist theory
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was never entirely thrust aside.

As a matter of fact, as we have

already seen, the Platonic form .of idealism in the hands of many
of its advocates has always leaned strongly toward

absolutism.

In the Medieval mystics the absolutist theory finds considerable_,
though not unambiguous, representation.

Thus, for example, Eck

hart, though unwilling to go all the way in the· denial of Time,
·almost implies as much.

Ueberweg presents one phase of his teach-

ing as follows: "out of God the creature is pure nothing; Time
and space and plurality, which depends on them, are
themselves." (1)

nothing in

Again, putting it more definit�ly, Ueberweg

presents Eckhart 1 s thought thus:

"When the creature had as yet

no existence for itself, it was yet eternally in God and in His
reason.

Creation is not a temporal act.

God did not literally

create heaven and earth, as we inadequately express it;
creatures are spoken of in the eternal word.
no work: there is one�,

for all

In God there is

a becoming without a becoming." (2)

It should be pointed out that the Absolutism of the Middle
Ages was an entirely different order from that of the ancient
Eleatics.

Parmenides and his followers, while perhaps having

been under the influence of Oriental mysticism, sought to found
their doctrine of the sole reality of unchanging Being upon
logical reasoning which was in the main negative.

a

P armenides

drew out the implications of the concept of Being in such a way
as to exclude Time.

Zeno tried to show the absurd consequences

of attempting to assert the reality of Time and change •
The Medieval mystics derived their inspiration, not from
the Eleatic logicians, but from the Neo-Platonists, in whose
thought there was a considerable religious element, and from
_l. Ibid., u. 469.
2 • Ibid., p. 475.
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their Christian tradition, which from the start inv olved some
mystical aspects.

Thus the absolutism of the Medieval mystics

was based not simply on a logical and negative foundation but on
a religious_ and positive foundation.

Their theory was not an in

terpretation of a concept, but an attempt to interpret an exper
ience.

It was not an analysis of an order of existence, but a

manner of expressing a fact of experience.
This meant,of course, that the Eternity of which it spoke
excluded the element of bemporality less rigidly than does that
of which the Eleatics spoke.

If a thing simply is,
-- so that

neither becoming nor passing away can have any application, it
is as rigidly as possible eternal and non temporal.

But, if

there is a state which is believed upon experimental grounds to
be beyond all distinctions, even beyond the distinctions between
Eternity and Time, and Being and non Being, while that state cer
tainly cannot be said to be temporal, temporality is not so defin
itely ruled out as in the former case.

The mystics are absolutists

but they are somewhat softened abso 7 utists who move in the direction
of a spiritualist theory.
IV.

The Modern Era

As scholastic philosophy gradually reduced itself to a nor:ii
nalism which surrendered. the hope of finding rational solutions
of the major problems of philosophy and new ir.ipulses that came
with the Renaissance and the Reformation began to take hold, it
became almost inevitable that a fresh start should be made in
metaphysical inquiry.
fresh

start

in

Modern philosophy has, in fact, made a

metaphyiical inquiry,

and its effect upon the

interpretation of Time and Eternity has been considerable.

rt
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has set forth certain suggestions which would probably seem
Quite naturally, however, the

rather novel to the ancients.

new thoughts have not arrived suddenly and fully for med.

We

have already seen how Medieval philosophy had already introduced
some spiritualist tendencies.

In the modern history of our pro

blem there are three distinct and gradual processes which go sim
ultaneously.

The first is the process by which a new approach

to the problem has emerged.

This process naturally belongs es

pecially to the earlier part of the modern era.

The seco�d is

the process by which upon the foundation of the new approach
there has gradually aeveloped a spiritualist theory of the rela
tion, of Time and Eternity to reality.

In its earlier phases

this process takes the form of more or less indefinite and un
coordinated suggestions in the minds of writers who were develop
ing

the new approach and who held alongside their spiritualist

suggestions major tenets of the older theories.

Later, this pro

cess expresses itself in a distinct spiritualist theory which
finds a number of distinguished modern advocates.

The third pro

cess is that by which the older theories have readjusted themselves
to the modern world.

In its earlier phases this process goes for

ward in the same great minds as the other tw� but later it emerges
in distinct form

in the thought

tives of the o.lder theories.

of the more recent representa

We must now trace these three pro-

cesses.
A. The New Approach
(I) Descartes
The real significance of Descartes with regard to the Time
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problem is not his own theory, which, as we are late� to see,
never really got beyond the older idealist theories, but in a gen
eral approach to philosophy which was revolutionary in its consequences.
Descartes began with a determination to doubt all things.
Thus he laid it down as a rule "never to receive anything as a
truth which I did not clearly know to be such. 11

( 1)

Again, re-

garding an important period of his experience, he declared: "I
gave particular attention to that in it which afforded occasion
for doubt." (2)

Thus far1 0escartes is like the Greek skeptics

who doubtless influenced him considerably.
However, the skepticism of Descartes was only tentative, a
doubting in order to believe.

n
"My whole desiP'll
o
, he wrote '

11

tend-

ed only to assurance and to the rejection of the shifting soil
or sand, to find solid foundation on rock or the hard clay." (3)
Out of the doubting of Descartes emerged two principles which
were destined to be of tremendous influence.

We may consider

them in order.
The first of the two principles which concern us .in Des
cartes's way of approaching reality is his insistence upon be
ginning with the self.

Up to the time of Descartes nearly al-1!--non

skeptical systems of philosophy had endeavored to deal with ob
jects of knowledge, taking the knower for granted.

Descartes, how

ever, subjecting all things to doubt and seeking for a sure point
at which to begin constructive thought, settled upon the self as
that which was most surely known.

Even doubt led to knowledge of

the self, for doubt was thought, and to think was to be a self.

l. Descartes: !he Discourse on Method, p. 46, in 11 '.:Phe Philosophy of
Descartes in Extracts fromHis Writings", Translated by H • .s. Tor:ewy.
2. Ibid., p. 56.
3. Ibid.
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In Descartes's own thought this principle was allowed to
work out in a dualistic philosophy that was too like the tradi
tional systems to involve any radically different concept of
Time.

Further, the Cogito ergo�

was itself not widely ac

cented as a beginning point by other philosophers.

However, the

spotlight of thought had now been turned upon the self, and as
the years nassed it was increasingly seen that any analysis of
metaphysical realities must take seriously into consideration
the part played

by the subjective consciousness.

The second of the factors which concern us in Descartes's ap
proach to reality is his insistence upon the value of the mathema
tical type of reasoning.
erable eminence.

Descartes was a mathematician of consid

Impressed as he was with the precision., of math

ematical sciences, it was not unnatural that he should discard
many of the ambiguous terms of scholastic philosophy and attempt
to present his thought in a form analogous to that of mathematics.
This approach has issued in a greater exactness in philoso
phical language and has led philosophical thought into a vastly
greater appreciation of the value of mathematical sciences, so
that, since Descartes, philosophy has taken not only much of its
form but many· of its most important ideas from :'•,the.se'·_· ... - sciences.
Thus, without developing a significant theory of the relation
of Time and Eternity to realitY, Descartes has set forward new tendencies of far reaching importance for the problem 0

'Ne must now

see how these new tendencies worked out in a number of writers
who, like Descartes, failed to develop theories of Time that were
significantly new, and yet contributed to the development of a

46

new approach to Time that ultimately issued in a theory that was
quite different from any

of the three traditional theories of

which we have spoken.
(II) seventeenth Centuny Rationalism
(A) Descartes I s attempt to bring mathematic_s into the s ervice
of philosophy was carried on in the work of Spinoza and Leibnitz.
The use of mathematics made by these writers was not essentially
different from that of Descartes.

Spinoza attempted with

even

greater vigor than did Descartes to work out a system of metaphj
sics on the model of geometry.

Although Leibnitzts use of the

mathematical principle was freer than that of Spinoza, and althougp
he made some independent contributions to mathematical science
itself, his system remained, like that of Spinoza, essentially a
rat ionalistic

attempt to deduce reality by mathematical methods

from certain first principles.
Applying mathematics in this way to the study of philosophy
Spinoza and Leibnitz did not immediately revolutionalize philoso
phical method.

Their method was somewhat mechanical and artificial.

Certainly it did not
However,

the

persist in the

mathematical

form

which they

approach ·of Leibnitz and

did accomplish two significant results.

gave it.
Spinoza

First, it influenced

philosophy to adopt a greater nrecision in language and�±n rea
soning after the pattern of mathematics.

Second, it was a step

in the direction of that close cooperation and mutual influence
that has come to characterize the relation of ma thematics and phi
losophy in recent years.

Of this we shall presently have more
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to say.
(B) Descartes's subjectivist tendency, like his mathematical
method, was carried forward
these

by Spinoza and Leibnitz.

Although

did not begin precisely as did Descartes with knowing and

then proceed to divide reality into thought and exte nsion, the
lesson of the metaphysical importance of the act of thinking was
so firmly impressed upon their minds that they felt obliged to
recogniz� it as an attribute of all reality.

Spinoza, unwilling

to posit more than one real substance, undertook to show that
thought and extension were only attributes of a single substance,
and Leibnitz, while by no means disposed to reduce all to a single
substance, contended that the fo��

which animated all individuals

was thought and extension brought into essential unity.

Without

being subjective idealists or even Cartesions, ·spinoza and Leibnit�
carried forward the idea that mind was essential to all reality.
); -" --�> __ ._--r:

',,,,!

Eighteenth century rationalism issued, on the one hand, in a
mathematical approach to philosophy and, on the other hand, in a
recognition of the importance of mind or spirit in any concept of
the universe.
(III) British'Emp�ricism: Locke, Berkeley, Hume
,..,
Across the English channel the mathematical method did not have
a great deal of influence.

However, the implications of the necessi

ty of bringing the fact: of the knower into consideration in meta
physical inquiries were worked out.
John Locke (1632-1704) did not literally begin , as did Des
cartes, with the certainty of self.

However, by making the funda

mental problem that of knowledge, he was in effect beginning , as
did Descartes, with the self.

The knowing self is real, taught
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Descartes; certain knowledge which the self attains is valid,
taught Locke.

Despite important differences the two affirmations

are basically simular.

In either case further progress is seen

to be dependent upon a recognition of the self.

In either case

the knowing process is the point of departure.
Locke's approach to all r eality from the standpoint of mind
became, in the writings of George Berkeley (1665-1753}, a bold
declaration that all reality consisted in minds and· the ideas of
minds.

Berkeley held that the primary qualities, extension, fi

gure, and motion, as well as the secondary ones, seeing, hearing,
taste, and smell, belong to the knowing mind.
is really dependent upon the knowing mind.

Hence every object

The Cartesian tendency

to regard mind as the starting point of philosophy was now a thor
oughgoing theory of subjective idealism.
David Hume (1711-1776) went a step beyond Berkeley and in so
doing reduced the thought of English £mp�r�cism to skepticism.
Agreeing with Berkeley that none of the qualities of objects in
hered in the objects, Hume was unaTule to find sufficient evidence
for the existence either of object or of mind.

Knowledge was re

duced to ideas and impressions which relate themselves by princi
ples of resemblance and contiguity and causality. (1) But even
these principles further reduced themselves to mere habip.(2)
The egocentric approach had now apnarently destroyed not only
the foundations of belief in the reality of the objective world, but
also the foundations of belief in the ego itself.

However, thibs by

no means ended the emphasis upon the importance of recognizing the
self or even affirmation

of the fact of the self, for as we are

presently to see, the recognition of the importance of knower con1. Weber and Perry: Ibid., p. 341.
2. "Ibid., pp. 333, 334.
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tinued to be a vital feature of modern philosophy,
affirming the

r eality

and new theories

and centrality of the ego wer e shortly to

appear .
(IV) Modern Classic�l Physics
Having now traced the major philosophical factors in what
we have termed the new app roach to the problem of Time, we must
now

record

some observations

the matter .

r egarding

the scientific side of

we have seen how Descar tes and the succeeding ration

alists cast their thought in mathematical molds.

The more impor -

tant aspect of Descartes's interest in mathematics was, however,
the stimulus that it gave to mathematics itself as a kindred
study of philosophy.
For all the subjectivism of Descartes 1 s philosophy, mathe
matical physicists, who had learned a good deal from Descar tes,
continued without hesitation to proceed upon the assumption of
the reality of an observable objective measurable continuum to
which its formuia.ecould be applied.

In this order of things

Time was still distinct and a real part of a fr amewor k in which
events might be oriented.
However, even in the mathematical physics of the ear ly par t
of the modern era a tendency of quite a different order was at
work.

Time had come to be regar ded as a factor in physical equa

tions, but if Time were one of the factors in physical equations,
it was at least conceivable that there was more than one Time as
there was more than one motion.

Accor dingly, the thovght was at

hand that the uniform Time in which we attempt to orient all
things was not an objective reality but a convenient arrangement
of our minds.

That none of the ear ly physicists took this thought

,ser �o��ll must not obscure the fact that it was already pr esent
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in germ in their speculations and that it would inevitably come
sooner or later to puay a significant role in physics.

The truth

is that even Newton himself, although without attaching importance
to the fact, was not unaware of the impossibility of actually
discovering a system of fixed references. (1)

Moreover, the older

physicists recognized certain imperfections in thei r own theories
which would one day issue in a more subjective view of Time.

How

the subdued relativist tenden cies in the older physic s were trans
lated into a theory of relativity which has had a significant re
lation to the spiritualist theory of Time we are to see when we
come to discuss the spiritualist theory itself.

For the present

it is enough:. to note that already in classical physics were ten
dencies which were to lead away from the idea of

the real and dis

tinct existence of Time as an objective order of being.
We may now proceed to summarize what has been said concerning
the� approach to metaphysical prob lems.

With the writings of

Descartes and his successors down to David Hume_. the manner in
which metaphysical problems (such as the Time question) had been
dealt with in the past underwent two profound changes.
The first change in the approach to metaphysical problems
was a shift from an objective to a subjective point of view.

The

Medieval philosophers had followed the Greeks in beginning with the
thing known rather than with the knower.

However, Descartes found

· the foundation of all speculation in the act of thinking, an d Spin
oza and Leibnitz felt obliged to make thought an essential attri
bute of all reality.

Locke regarded all metaphysical �peculations

as dependent upon an understanding of the knowing process and
1. Cf. Sir James Jeans: Th� �ew Background of Science, p. 79.
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Berkeley, pursuing the same line of thought, found it necessary
to reduce existences to two, minds and ideas.

Hume carried the

process to the ultimate extreme, declaring that ideas, or the
atoms of the

knowing process itself, were all that

certainly said to exist.

could be

Thus did philosophy shift its emphasis

until) instead of being concerne d with relations between objects
of knowledge, its attention was absorbed in analysing the know
ing process,and its entities were reduced to the elements of
the knowing process.

It was a shift of emphasis from known to

knower, from object to spirit.

The second change in the approach

to metaphysical problems was the shift from a conceptual and logi
cal way of dealing with physical relations to a ma thematical way.
The ancient Greeks and their Medieval successors had undertaken
to work out the problems of physics in terms of the kind of con
cepts that were employed in everyday speech and in metaphysics.
H.owever, in such wri ters as Descartes there came to be an in
creasing recognition that the more precise statements of mathe
matical formulas were required to express physical relations.

Al

though Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz endeavored to give too
wide an application to the mathematical type of reasoning, mathe
matics became more and more recognized as a way of expressing
physical rela tions, and philosophy more and more ready to accept
the results of a mathemat ical physics.
We must now see how these two new instruments of philosophy,
the subjective approach and the mathematical emphasis, have af
fected

consideration of the problem of the relation

of Tim� and

Eternityto1•real:ictt7. we may at this stage in our discussion note
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in a very general way that the major effects of the new approach
were two: first, the development of a new theory of the rel ation of
Wlrhec:andEternityto:rea.lity,and second, the bringing about of cer
tain important changes in the older theories as they are present
ed by modern writers.
B. A New Theory: Spiritualtsm
In a preliminary statement

we defined spiritualism as the

·theory that Time and Eternity are concepts which mind has im
pressed somewhat arbitrarily upon reality which is intrinsically
of quite

a different sort.

This implies fundamentally three

things: 1. that Time is in some sense an arbitrary product of
mind, 2. that essentially the same is true of Etern ity, 3. that
reality is bas ically different from the Eternity-Time form.

We

are now to see how during a long period first one, then another
of these ideas cropped out in the thought of various writers,
until at last all appear together and there is a distinctly
spiritualist theory of Time and Eternity.
(I) Early Expressions of Various Aspects of the Spirit
ualist Theory
(A) Although retaining in connection with his idea of
extension the notaon of regular and external Time and never at
tempting to exclude the idea of Eternity, Descartes insisted
upon the idea of

the complete freedom of God.

This insistence

is in itself an expression of the characteristic spiritualis t
idea that ultimate reality is of a different onder from that
which can be described in terms of Time and Eternity, the idea
of the spirituality of ultimate reality.
When Descartes came to consider the condition of the extern
al world he felt that a proper recogni'tion of the majesty

of
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God required the concept that the world was created ane w in each
moment.

Such a theory certainly does not suggest the idea of an

objective time frame and seems to imply the spirituality of reali
ty.
However, Descartes continued to regard the constantly renew
ed world as describable in regular and mechanical terms, and 1 of
course"when the idea of an invariable order of renewal was intro
duced, the idea of an objective temporal order was not far away.
(B) Spinoza's contribution· to spiritualism was twofold. First,
his effort to overcome the dualism of mind and matte� by declar
ing that thought an d extension were attributes of the same reality
directed attention toward the idea that consciousness was to be
associated with all reality.

Second, Spinoza distinguished be

tween reality as seen under the aspect of Eternity and as seen'
under the-�a.spect of Time.(l)
The first suggestion would tend to f'urther the s iiritualist
idea of the spirituality of ultimate reality.

The second wo uld

tend to suggest the possibility that Time and Eternity were im
pressed upon reality by mind; for, when the idea is present that
reality can be seen under this aspect or that, the thought is not
far away that this_ aspect or that is impressed upon this thing by
the one who sees.

Neither suggestion, however, was developed

either by Spinoza or by his immediate success.ors.
(C) Leibnitz was so devoted to the detarminist
that his contribution to the spiritualist
direct.

hypothesis

theory was Jargely in

However, in two points Leibnitz has made contributions

toward the theory.
1. Frank Thilly:

In the f'irst place, the concept of' force as
History of Philosophy, p. 299.
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being beyond the dualism of thought and extension involved a
faint suggestion that Time, like space, might be but an aspect
of a deeper spirit 2. like reality.

In the second place, his

theory of monads puts individuality at the center of things and
in so doing tends to make such patterns as Eternity and Time
secondary to spirit, despite his determinist principles.
(D) In the philoso phy of John Locke there are a number of
interesting and rather sur prising suggestions in the direction
of the first of the three important ideas of

spiri tualism, name

ly, that Time ·is a subjective product of mind.

In the first

place, the sensationalism of Locke ·. is in itself a tendency that
has significance in leading toward the relativist conclusions
of modern physics, which, as we shall see, are of considerable
importance for the spiritualist theory.

But beyond this1 Locke

distinguishes between duration and Time and regards the latter
as merely a mode of the former(l) (a suggestion that would seem
to have influenced Bergson's elaboration of such a distinction
in Time and the yreedom

�!

the Will). When Time has become only

a mode of an idea.it is on the border of becoming only a subject
ive product of mind.

A third suggestion of Locke's was his idea

of the relativity of Time spans. (2)

To be sure, Locke do es not

here suppose as does Bergson that the reality behind Time is no t
really subject to regular measurement, but it is easy to see how
his suggestion leads in that direction.

Dates, he says, are rela

tive to other dates and ages to other ages.
1. Ibid., P• 312.
2. Locke: An Essay concerning the Human Understanding, Books II
and IV, Edited by Calkins, p. 234.
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(E) Berkeley's thought carries Locke's tendency to reduce
Time to subjectivity still farther, for Berkeley eliminated all
realitj.es except minds and ide9:s, and specifically indicated that
Time was nothing apart from ideas.
(F) David Hume went even beyond Berkeley in denying objecti
vity to Time.

Hume first reduced the world of which Time would

be the pattern to ideas and impressions and then attempted to
reduce all rules apolying to the succession
ions to mere habit.

of ideas and impress

Such a system completely exc.ludes the idea

of an objective Time.

Time is now not even an order of ideas,

for order is taken away.

Time becomes little more than habit.

( II) The .. �Fir.st Representativ�s of Spiritualism
The first real representative of what we have called spiri
tualism is $mnanuel Kant, who, despite his unwillingness to re
nounce altogether the tenets of the older theories, nevertheless
embodied all three of the essential spiritualist emphases, namely,
a subjectivist idea of Time,

a subjectivist idea of Eternity,

and a non determinate view of reality.
Kant's thought of the subjectivity of space and Time seem
to have beenctconviction:, that went back to a comparatively early
point in

his thought.

a priori elements

However, it was in his search after such

in experience as would give universal valid-

ity to knowledge that he set this idea forth clearly.
connection emphatically and repeatedly

In this

he affirmed that Time

is a form of experience rather than an object of knowledge.

we

shall let him speak for himself.
In the Transcendental Aesthetfuc

of his Critique of pure
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Reason , after examining the concept of space which he takes to
be the pure form of primary intuitions, Kant comes to an analysis
of the intuition of Time.
conception." (1)

Time, he declares, is "not an empirical

It is rather, he says, the "foundation" of our

ideas of succession as well as of simultaneity.(2)

Indeed, he

says that it is at the· fo undation of all our intuitions, that if
all else were thought .away the intuition of Time would remain.(3)
Time is not empirical, neither is it a "general conception" for
-this reason: nits representation can only be given by a s ingle ob
ject .11( 4)

Thus, Time unmistakably,. loses its quality as an ob

jective - reality and becomes a way of looking at reality impose d
by the mind.
When we consider Kant 1 s attitude toward Eternity the situa
tion

is somewhat different.

ity a form of experiencing.

Kant does not definitely make Etern
However, his thought on

we believe, comes essentially to this.

the whole,

It is from the outset

clear enough that Kant is unwilling to allow the possibility that
Eternity is an object of our knowledge.

The insistence that Time

is a form of all knowledge precludes that_.

But if Eternity is not

known,how can it be euen a form or pattern of knowledge?
answer is not far to seek.

The

The categories of Kant stand for pret

ty much the same thing as the Eternity of Plato, and since Kant•s
categories are clearly forms of knowledge, Kant is in effect
taking the Eternity to which Plato ascribed objective reality
and making of it a form of knowledge.
Having made Time and Eternity essentially forms of experience
fastened upon reality by mind, Kant is by no means dogmatic when
1. Kant: The Critique of pure Reason, Translated by Meiklejohn, p.28.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p.29 •.
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he undertakes to tell what the nature of the reality beyond the
forms is.

Pure intellect, he thinks, throws no light upon the

subject.

All that intellect can do is to speak of the unknown

"thing in itself".

However, conscience gives us some c lues.

It demands belief in a spiritual God, in freedom, and in a life
that does not perish.

This, of course, leaves the matter quite

indefinite, but it represents an unmistakable affirmation that
Freedom is at the center of things.
of :such

Ultimate reality is not

nature that its pattern can be fully marked out by

the determinist pattern of Eternity and Time.
Thus, Kaat•s theory presents unmistakably all of the essen
tial tenets of a spiritualist view of Time and Eternity.

Time

and Eternity are not aspects of objective reality, but something
which mind has impressed upon a reality which is essentially of
a different type.
We must not,,however , leave Kant without pointing out an
other side of his thought.

There are two . important respects in

which Kant does not entirely eliminate the prevailing idealist
tendencies of his day.
an inevitable,
duals.

In the first place, Time is descri�ed as

unvarying form which is the same for all indivi

This is considerably short of the view of later spiritual

ists who regard Time as only a result of an unfortunate habit of
most minds.

Whether night ly or wrongly, Kant persists in ascrib

ing at les,st this much of objectivity to Time and Eternity, that
both are more than arbitrary habits, being inevitable and unvary
ing forms of e�perience.

This much of a place in reality Kant

continues to ascribe to Time and Eternity.

Time and Eternity do
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not, for him, belong to the thing "in itself 11 ; bu t they continue
to belong to reality at least as invariable forms starnped upon
the t hing as seen.
(III) Fichte
we have seen how,despite Kant 1 s refusal to allow an assured
place in objective reality either to Time or to Eternity, he con
tinued to ascribe some place in reality to both.

Both were for

him at leas t the same inescapable forms in all intellects.
J. G. Fichte did not eliminate these remnants of an objective
view of Time and Eternity.

He did modify them.

To Fichte the

e.go was not as it tended to be to Kant, a mechanically divisible
structure of intellectual, moral, and aesthetic and teolological
parts.

It was rather an indivisible whole of which the practi

cal or moral element was the vital one.

Moreover , this e;go was

not bound by Time bu t was conscious of a supertemporal d estiny.
Clearly such a being is less rigidly limited by the forms of
Time and Eternity than the b·eing w hom Kant describes.

Time, for

Fichte, flowed from intellect and indeed became a ground of possibility of more.l lifetl); but it was essentially the product of a
free supertemporal spirit rathen than of a rigid intellect.

Ac

cordingly,it lost some of its remaining objectivity and became
a little m ore arbitrary.

In like manner, while eternal forms of

thought continued as aspects of intellect,they became the tools
of practical aspirations and so were one step farther removed
from ob jective reality.
(IV) Bergson
After the days of Ficl?-te, the philosophy of -spiritualism was
1. Weber and Perry:··rbid., p. 395.
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in some degree submerged under the intellectualist emphasis that
followed in the wake of Hegel.

However, the spiritualist influence

was kept alive and nurtured in France by Main de Biran, cousin,
Ravaisson, and Boutroux.

It was revived in Germany through the

philosophy of Schopenhauer, whose pessimism grew out of his con
viction of the urimacy of will.

The same tendency was fostered

by the writings of Herbart and Nietzsche.

The teachings of Lotze

and Fechner contributed materially especially to the interpreta
tion of the concept of the spirituality of nature.

To this list

we may add with special emphasis William James whose pragmatistic
outlook added a somewhat new and distinctive angle to the pluralist suiritualism which he advocated.

Naturally such presentations

of the spiritualist, philosophy as the above, would tend to foster
a spiritualist solution of the

problem of the relation of Time

and Eternity to reality, for example, Fechner came to think of
the past as having a psychical nature in God, ( l)u,4William James
developed the fruitful thought of the extended psychological
moment.However, without an effort to present in detail the contri
butions of the impressive list of modern spiritualists we turn
at onoe to a consideration of the thought of that one of their
number in whom, despite the naturalistic influences that color
mis thought, the most distinctive features of the spiritualist
view of Time and Eternity receive perpaps their fullest expression.
1. Kant had held that Time was a product of mind rather than
an attribute of objective reality.

He had, however, refrained

from making Time an arbitrary product of individuai minds,regard
ing it as a form which mind has already strunped upon reality when
1. Ibid., p. 519.
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we become a,vare of it.

Bergson, however, boldly presents Time

not only as lacking objective reality, but as wanting any necess
!!:.ry connection with objective reality.

Time becomes a mere prac

tical habit of mind.
It must be made clear from the start that Bergson does not
eliminate or explain away the element of successiveness.
this is 1.uite fundamental with him.

Indeed,

It is for its want of a

genuine recognition of this element that he criticises modern
science.(l)

How then does he come to regard Time as a mere

practical habit of mind, having little connection with reality ?
Bergson accomplishes this by distinguishing sharply between Time
or "clock time" as the ordered invariable succession which we
measure by clocks, the stars and the like, and which offers the
same possibilities to ail, and duree
cession of consciousness and life.

as the indeterminate suc

Upon the basis of this d is

tinction, while unhesitatingly affirming that succession belongs
to reality, Bergson denies that Time belongs to reality.
vigorous

Although

in his affirmation of the fact of successiveness, he is

untiring in his disparagement of ordered Time, which he considers
as nothing but a spreading out of successiveness in space, a
nullifying of real successiveness.
Of course the question may arise as to whether it is really
Time that Bergson means when he refers to "clock time" (as he calls
it in Creative Evolution (2), abstract Time ).

The question be-

contincomes particularly pointed when it is noted tha t Bergson
,
ues to use the word Time

for what he elsewhere calls dure'e, re

ferring in Creative Evolution

to concrete Time.

1. Bergson: Creative Evolution, pp. 336-338.
2. Ibid., p.�-.-·-

However, as we
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have all along contended, Time has always meant a regular uniform
ly divisible continuum of succession which offers
bilities to all.

the same possi

This is precisely what Bergson means by "clock

time 1� and if something else for which even Bergson continues to
use the word Time has regularly. been associated with Time, it is
only because it has qualities simular to Time, not because it .is
essentially

what men have meant by Time. Accordingly, we feel

reasonably safe in assuming that what Bergson is concerned to
deny to reality is nothing more nor less than Time.
But if Bergson denies a place in reality to Time, what does
he do with this Time which he tries to exclude from reality? In
what does he go beyond Kant's idea that Time is an invariable form?
Bergson contends that Time is nothing more than a practical habit
of mind.

Of course Bergson recognizes that the Time habit is

deeply ingrained in thought, but he holds that it is quite possi
ble to see reality in other than a temporDl way.

For practical

purposes, men have needed to know something of the future, and so
they have formed the habit of arranging things in a determinate
Time order.

However, by shutting out practical intellect they

can, in intuition, live re all ty ln the indeterminate way in which
it really exis.ts.

Thus does Bergson destroy most of the connection

with objective reality that Kant allowed to Time.
even

a form invariably associated with reality.

Time is now not
rt is only a sort

of an unfortunate habit that individuals have fallen into and from
which a return to intuition will progressively free them.
2. Bergson is perhaps even more emphatic in denying that Etern
ity belongs to reality than in denying that Time belongs to reality.
He contends, ·especially in his creative Evolution

that any philo-
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sophies which insist upon the concept of Eternity,whether in terms
of intellectual concepts (1), mechanistic laws(2), or final causes
{3),are at best only partially true.

This he contends upon the

following, among other grounds: 1. that such philosophies depend
on the selection of certain incidents out of the totality of events,
neglecting others which

are equally important,4), 2. that they

regard the units of successive reality as mere forms, neglecting
the units themselves which are the really important factors,
3. that they fall short of an adequate notion of continuity,
4. that the need for the self sufficiency(5) in reality,which such
philosonhies think demands the idea of Eternity,
i'n

may oe: met· ·

I

duree, 5. that such philosophies give no real significance

to the processes

which are at work in life , so all phases are

· on a dead level(6Q.
Objecting thus to the idea of an objectively real Eternity,
Bergson goes on in the same way in which he has dealt with Time
to try to show that the idea of Eternity arises out of a practi
cal habit of intellect which

has little value as an attempt to

present the actual state of things.
3.

It is now clear enough that Bergson attempts to reduce

Time and Eternity to the status of more or less arbitrary pro
ducts of mind which do not have any essential place in reality.
What does Bergson consider the nature of the pattern of the real
ity that lfues beyond the forms of Time and Etennity to be ?
Bergson things of essential reality in very much the same
1 � Ibid., p. 342.
2� :_Ibid.
3.- Ibid., p. 5 .
9
4.- Ib id., pp. 330-336,
p. 7.
5 . Ibid., p� 398.
6. Ibid., p. 16.
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terms as all of his spiritualist predecessors.

Reality is funda-

mentally free spirit, undetermined will, voluntary purpose, life.
If its pattern, relative to succession, is to be drawn it must be
drawn not in terms of a rigid Eternity-Time form, but in terms of
spontaneity.
The chief difference between Bergson and his predecessors
is that Bergson having before him the discoveries and ways of
thinking of modern biological studies is able to take the idea
of spontaneous vital force more deeply and more definitely into
the lower levels of exist.e.nce than were his predecessors.

Thus,

the entire living world becomes one vast expression of a restless
vital force or elan vital

which works itself out now in this

direction, now in that, being never completely determined or pre
dictable.
This does not, of cou�se, mean that the reality of which
Bergson speaks has no direction or purpose.
that of chaos.

Its freedom is not

Direction and purpose are there;

they are free

direction and purnose rather than rigid force and determined direc
tion such as can be compilietely reduced to an Eternity-'11 ime pattern.
Again, we must call attention to the fact that while Bergson's
ultimate reality is neither temporal nor eternal, it retains
some qualities in common with these states.

The duree

in terms

of which Bergson repeatedly describes reality does not have, like
Time, the pronerty,,

of regularity.

It does share with the tra

ditional notion of Time something of the quality of successivene ss,
and it embodies the experience, which has often been associated
with the word Time, of uncertainty. (1)
1.

Ibid., pp. 339-340.

Simularly, Bergson's
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duree is, v1hile certainly different from Eternity, not devoid
of the qualities of Eternity.
self.

It gathers up the past into it

It is not incompatible with the idea of self-sufficiency;(l)

it involves no denial of the so cRlled laws of science but dentes
that . they · determine

events··.

We may, then, summerize Berg-

son1 s account of reality by saying that, for Bergson, reality
is vital force or free spirit which is constantly working itself
out in a pattern of purposive_ spontaneity which being neither
temnoral nor eternal nor both, yet has some aspects of each.
( V) The Contributions of Modern science
our account of the-spiritualist theory of Time and Eternity
would be by no means complete without some reference to the con
tributions of modern science.
Time

Every theory of the relation of

and Eternity and reality is influenced by the findings of

its contemporary science.

In the case of the spiritualist theory

the influence of recent science has been quite considerable.
We have already indicated that even classical physics, by
its insistence upon bringing Time within its formulkand by its
recognition of certain gaps in its theory, was already contri
buting_ something to that new approach to metaphysical problems
which issued in the spiritualist theory.

During the last half

of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth
rapid and remarkable develouments took place in the scientific
world which aE least in a negative way gave very considerable
supoort to the spiritualist theory.
We may first indicate the general character of the devel
ouments in science to which we refer, and then show briefly their
1. Ibid., 0. 298.
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bearing upon the theory in question.
(A) 1. The first of the remarkable changes in scientific
thought which bears upon our problem is the new approach of phy
sics to the whole problem of space and Time that has emerged
out of the application of experimental and mathematical methods
to the difficulties wh ich classical physics had left unresolved.(l)
For many years it was assumed that the gaps in the mechanical
theory

were only minor difficulties that in .due time would be

resolved along the general lines laid down by classical physics.
However, a series of discoveries, falling ma�nly

in the last

half century have proyed the reverse to be true.

Recognition of

the we_nt of intuitive ce.rtf,inty

attaching

to Euclid 1 s postulate

that when two lines are intersected by a third line and the interior
angles on the same side of the intersecting line. are equal to two
right angles, the intersected lines will no.t :m�et(2)_:has, .l�.d to the unfolding of whole new systems
conceived to be : ·s·lighfay
that there was

of. geometry in which space may be

curved.

'J'hus it could no longer be assumed

only'one way in which space could be regarded.

Again, the impossibility of finding an actual point of rest has
led to the question

as to whether such a point existed at all and

the assumption that it did not.

Once more, certain apparent irregu

larities in the behavior of light led to a new way of regarding
the framework within which light moved.

In short, investigation of

the supoosed minor gaps in the older physics has led to the con
viction that they ware not in reality minor at all but of such im
portance that a reinterpretation of the whole concept of space and
Time was demanded.

This could not but have a significant bearing

1. For a general consideration of this subject see Jeans: -The --New
Background of Science, pp. 70-110.
2.QT. The Americana on Non Euclidean Geometry, Vol. 12, p. 463.
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on the problem of the relation of Eternity and Time to reality.
2. The second important change in modern science was the
emergence of the concept of organic evolution as a relatively
well established scientific theory.

The general concept of

organic evolution may be traced back as far as the early Greek
philosophers.

It found some support in-Aristotle and was not

entirely lost sight of in the Middle Ages.

Early nineteenth cen

tury scient ists toyed with the idea but without making material
progress.

So far the idea remained a rather hazy suggestion

which was not taken very seriously.

However, when Charles Dar

win presented the theory of organic evolution in a clear cut
scientific manner, accompanying his thougl1ts with an imposing
mass of evidence, the course of scientific thought began to
change.

Idealistic intellectualism received a severe blow and

naturalistic philosophies a considerable impetus.
(B� The above tendencies of modern science have contributed
significantly to the support of the spiritualist interpretation
of the relation between Eternity and Time.
1. �hey have in four imnortant ways created at least a
negative su�gestion in favor of the idea that Time
uniform continuum is

as a single

a product of mind in its· effort to deal

with the universe.
a. The reinterpretation of the background of the universe
demanded by modern physics involves a failure to f ind evidence
for a Time that is the same for all persons in all places and
at all rates of motion.

Thus, for example, Sir James Jeans

writes as .follows concerning intuitive "concepts of space and
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time" ( 1): "Nothing in our experiences or experiments justifies
us in extending either this or any other parochial scheme to the
whole of nature on the supposition that it
of objective reality." (2)
lar vein
affair.

represents any sort

J. Arthur Tholl1$on

writes. in a simu

in his ·outline of Science: "Time is merely a local
As the measuring rod creates space, so it is clocks

which create time.

We cannot form any idea of absolute time

or of absolute space.

As we shall see, we make a wrong supposi

tion if we suppose that an interv.al

of time and an interval of

space between t�o given phenomena are the same for every

obser-

ver whatso-ever and whatever the conditions of observation may be. 11 (3)
Of course the mere denial of the fact of a s ingle physical
time continuum does not establish the idea of the dependence of
Time upon spirit.

However, whereas most of the older philoso

nhgrs approached the Time problem under the assumption that the
thing that they studied somehow existed in nature, modern philo
sophers must approach the problem under the definite protest of
the physicist that there is no evidence in nature for the exist
ence of that single continuum which has generally been meant by
Tine. This means that the modern scientific idea of �ime obliges
. the modern philoso'.)her to seek some explanation £or the origin
of the "rime experience and concept that does not rest upon the
idea of an absolute Time continuum that is physically demonstrable.
Of course, various ways of meeting the situation have been pre
sented, but certainly one of the most obvious ia in the spiritual
ist idea that Time is an imperfect product of mind.·.
1. Jeans: Ibid., p. 95.
2. Ibid., p. 96.
3. J. Arthur Thomson: The Outline of Science, p. 1026.
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b. A second important phase of the reinterpretation by
modern physics of the framework of the universe is t he insist
ence that Time must be welded with space in a single spacetime continuum.

Jeans writes:

11

We discover that the primary in

gredients of nature are not objects existing in space and time,
but events in the continuum.n (1)

J. Arthur Thomson in his

outline of Science puts it as simply and definitely as possible.
Speaking of the Einstein theory, which he presents as accepted
teaching of science, he writes: "The theory asserts that: the actual
reality which underlies all the manifestations we experience is
neither spacial nor temporal nor material, but a blend of all
three. 11 (2)

ttThere is no essential distinction between time and

the three dimensions (Length, Breadth, Thickness) of Space

......

'rime enters into nhysical phenomena in the same way as the dir
ections in space ••••" (3)

Physics has revealed that measurements

which deal only with space and Time as separate have, when taken
from bodies moving at various speeds, a way of presenting all
kinds of contradictory reports, but

that, as Thomson puts it,

"there is a certain combination of snace and time measurements
on which everyone agrees, whatever their state of motion." (4)
As in the case of the scientific doubt concerning the exist
ence of absolute �ime, so in the case of the scientific

idea of

the welding of space and �ime, more than one philosophical ac
count of the situation

is possible.

However, if the Time which

the most careful analysis discovers appears to be not a distinct
order but only one aspect of a continuum which must

be regarded

as a whole if consistent results are to be obtained in physical
l.Jeans: Ibid., p. 101.
2.�homson: Ibid., p. 1033.
3.Ibid., p. 1034.
4.Ibid., p. 1037.
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measurements,

the spiritualist suggestion that the concept of

Time is merely a product of mind is likely to arise.
c. The principal feature of the doctrine of

organic evolu

tion is,of course,J the idea that various types of complex life
forms have developed out of simple life forms in the course of
the centuries.
As long as it was taken for granted that certain unchange
able life forms were brought into existence at the beginning of
the world the matter of Time was scarcely a problem relative to
organic forms.

These forms simply could exist in Time or without

Time and their existing

or

the pattern of succession.

not existing had little to do wi th
When the theory of organic evolution

was first introduced. it was assumed in keeping with the mechani
cal science of the day that mechanical forces working in a vast
time stretch were adequate to explain the changes i n organic
forms.

However, a better understanding of organic life forms

and a more careful scrutiny of the difficulties involved has led
to the conviction, at least on the part of many scientists, that
mechanical forces and Time were not adequate to explain the evolu
tion of the species.

This has rendered scientifically plausible

such a suggestion as that of Bergson that

the underlying deter-

minant of the species is something that is ultimately neither a
set of eternal types nor a body of mechanical principles by
which the whole process may be fitted into a symmetrical time
na�tern, but a more fundamental type of reality of which mechani
cal forces and Time are only external aspects.
2. The remarkable shift in the point of view of modern phy
sical science and the emergence of the theory of organic evolu
tion have not only contribute d to the idea that Time is a product
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of mind,they

have strengthened the suggestion that Eternity is

a pattern which mind fastens upon reality.

This comes about in

three ways.
a. One of the strongholds of those who believe in the reali
ty of Eternity has al�ays been the idea of a self sufficient space
and matter.

These entities were not thought of as the essence

of Eternity or necessarily as eternal at all.

Geometrical ar

rangements and atoms could at the same time be pointed to as il
lustrations of that which is essentially unaffected by Time.

How

ever, modern science contends that no location in space can remain
stationary and that there is no unchanging matter.

The absolutist

and the idealist are thus deprived of their illustrations and
obliged to admit that unchanging geometrical patterns and unchanging
atoms are at least not discoverable in physical reality.

The sus

picion, accordingly, emerges that the order of Eternity itself as
well as the illustrations in

question are basically products of

mind.
b.

A second stronghold of those who hold that Eternity be

longs to reality is the idea of law of nature.

However, certain

modern philosonhers, supported b� the relativist discovery that
by measuring objects

from different points of view discordant

results are obtained, have come to the conclusion that the answer s
to all questions regarding the universe are dependent upon the
point of view from which the questions are asked.

The universe

would appear as a vast vieltering sea of elusive reality concern
ing which facts might be discovered only as the scientist, by
the very form of his 9uestions, projected himself in some degree
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upon the universe.

In such a type of thought the idea of an

eternal law belonging to the universe itself would retain little
meaning.
c.

As long as the species of life forms were thought of es

being made once ro·r all; biological science had no quarrel with
the idea of a -_real Eternity.

Indeed, the very forms of the var

ious species might be taken as illustrations of eter nal ideas.
However, the introduction of the theory of organic evoluti on
has nrese nted the species as transcient nhases in a constantly
changing process.

But if there is no changeless species in the

nhysical world, the suggestion is that perhaps the whole of reali
ty is in constant flux, that, as the pragmatist suggests, our
ideas are not representatives of eternal realities, but practi
cal ways, that may be constantly improved upon, of dealing with
changing si tuation·s.
3. Having now illustrated at some length how modern science
with its reinterpretation of the framework of the universe and
its theory of organic ·evolution has tended. to throw doubt upon
the idea that Time --and Eternity belong to reality and to suggest
that both may be only convenient arrangements introduced into a
complex order by mind, we may now note briefly how modern science
tends to support spiritualism in what it has to say about the
question as to what reality actually is.
Certainly modern science continues to thin_� of reality· as
involving succession.

However, equally clearly modern science

softens the dogmatism of older science regarding the determinate
nature of that succession.

Modern physics tends to see space,

Time, and matter as drawn into a single entity;

it sees its in-
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dividual electrons moving according to no known law;
imoossible to fix velocity and place at the same tirne�
seem to ignore mechanical principles.

it finds it
Its quanta

Simularly, modern biology

no longer casually assumes eternal principles and regular move
ments which can be harmoniously fitted into a homogenious Time
pattern but speaks of impulse, mutations, and vital urges.

It

moves away from the older mechanism of Darwinism and allows some
room for freedom and spontaneity.

In such ways does modern science

contain at least in germ the suggestion that ultimate reality is
of the order of free spirit.
C.

Modern Expressions of the Older Theories

Since the four types of theory which we have consid ered re
present not four views as to what empirical facts are,

but rea

sonable ways of internreting empirical facts, it is not surprising
to find each of the three earlier types of theory nersisting
alongside spiritualism in our modern era.

At the same time, since

the spiritualist theory is based upoh a new type of approach to
metaphysical problems, it is not strange that the older theories
are eonsiderably modified in their more recent expressions.
(I) Modern Expressions of Absolutism
(A) Spinoza
By the time that the absolutist theory began to find express
ion among thinkers who could be called modern, interest in the
world of sense perception and belief in its reality had become
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too firmly established in modern thought to permit absolutism to
recur in the thoroughgoing form which it took in parmenides.

Its

great modern representative, Spinoza, was a man of the modern
world.

Moreover, he was a disciple of Descartes.

Accordingly,_

despite the fact that his theory minimizes the ele ment of suc
cession, he retains a far more lively impression of its importance
than does Parmenides.
Attempting to deduce everything from a unified self-sufficient
and all inclusive substance, Spinoza finds thought and extension
to be attributes or indispensable qualities of sub stance.

He

further finds intellect and will, and rest and motion to be modes
or dependent modifications of the above attributes.

In this scheme

Time1 which finds a sort of place under each of the attributes,is
decidedly subordinated to Eternity, which is of the essence of
ultimate reality.
When he considers the attribute of thought, Spinoza contrasts
the manner of seeing things under the aspect of Time and that of
seeing reality under the aspect of Eternity.(l)
to be considered a sadly inferiou
above w hich we ought to rise.

The former seems

way of seeing things, a way

The latter is the true way of see

ing things.
When Spinoza considers the attribute of exte nsion, Time,of
course;enters the picture as a phase of motion and rest.
a nd rest are themselves in no sense self sufficient.
merely forms which the eternal substance takes.

But motinn

They are

They belong to

the eternal substance as the properties of the triangle· follow
f�om the nature of the triangle, not as effect
1.· Th-illy: Ibid., p. 299.
2. Ibid.

follows from cause. ('2)
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Moreover, however

much individual things may change, the 1 "face

of the whole universe"' does not change.
All this together seems fairly definitely to place Spinoza•s
thought among the absolutist theories.

However, we must not fail

to note that in accord with the age in which he lived, Spinoza
could not bring himself, despite the implications of his first
principles, to deny altogether the reality of change and Time.
Indeed, he felt obliged to admit the contingency of particular
facts and to acknowledge that they could not be logically deouct
ed from substance. ( 1)

However. unimportant this fact s eeme:d to

him, Spinoza was quite frank in allowing its truth.

Thus

his

must remain an absolutism which has been significantly modified
by its e�a, an absolutism in principle and intent but not always
in detail.
( B 1} Bradley
The only other modern representative of absolutism and whom
we need consider is F.H. Bradley.

Bradley contended that the

very fact that we are obliged to think about a thing indicated
that the thing was not as it appeared(2), that every thought
pointed beyond itself and was never complete, that thought could
never comnlete its task since every relation pointed to another .(3)
By a method simular to this Bradley reduced Time (4) to the status
of appearance, while continuing to affirm the reality of Eternity.
However, in at least three important respects Bradley's theory
tones down the absolutism of Parmenides.

First, Bradley sets out

not from the formal concept of "being", but from the vital con
cept of knowing, so that his concepts are never so isolated from
1.
2.
3.
4.

Ibid., P• 292.
Weber and Perry; Ibid., P• 545.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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life and movement as those of Parmenides.

second, Bradley is un

willing to deny the fact of appearances to which he ascribes some
place in the eternal Absolute.

Finally, the Absolute of which

Bradley speaks is not merely a static concept, but as the fore
going statement would indicate, a sort of a comorehensive exist
ence

which does not altogether exclude vitality,

11

an individual

experience, in which all appearances are harmoniously resolved".(1)
Thus, for Bradley

Time is appearance and only the Absolute real,

but at the same time appearance is not altog&nher lost nor the
Absolute unequivocally eternal.
(II)

Modern Expressions of Idealism

Of the three older traditions regarding the Time problem
which have come down from antiquity into modern times idealism
has probably found the largest number of adherents.

Not only have

those writers whose suggestions have paved the way for the spirit
ualist theory continued to hold in the main to the ideal ist theory
but even successors of Kant reverted to idealist theories and
were in time followed by numbers of recent idealists.
time, it is

At the same

equally clear that modern expressions of idealism,

like modern expressions of absolutism, are by no means the same
a s their ancient counterparts.

Modern idealism differs from both

in point of departure and in quality of conclusion.
(A) Apart from spiritualistic suggestions which we have al
ready mentioned, Descartes's theory was
believe d that God existed as eternal. (2)

essentially idealist.

He

He was equally convinced

that the universe had been set in a continuous motion ( which would
imnly a real Time)

by the creator. (3)

1. Ibid., p. 546.
2. Thilly, Ibid., p. 278.
3. Ibid., p. 281 • .

However, it is abundantly
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clear that these conclusions wer� unlike Plato's,

founded not

upon an attempt to grasp reality in terms of objective ideas,
but rather upon a subjective fact.

It is equally clear, in the

light of Descartes's insistence upon the freedom of God, that
however large a place Descartes gave to the order of Eternity and
Time, he continued to hold alongside these ideas an idea that
freedom was in some sense at the center of things.
(B) Leibnitz, like Descartes, was essentially an idealist
in theory of Time, Eternity, and reality.

His belief in the reali

ty of Eternity is showed in several ways.

He is quite convinced

that there are certain truths, such as those of logic. and geome
try, which are eternal.

These truths presume the existence of

an eternal intellect.(l) Once again he held that this

is the

best possible world and that God is obliged to act in accord
with His own laws.

Finally, even the principles involved in the

monads implied the reality of something eternal. (2)
Nevertheless,

however

much Leibnitz shares ·with Plato, his

is not the somewhat static idealism of Plato.

The ultimate prin

ciple is force. Existences are not Ideas but spiritual monads.
Even the supreme Being is a spiritual Being, not an Idea.

Thus,

without sharing the subjectivist starting point of Descartes,
Leibnitz's idealism is one which goes beyond �escartes in recog
nizing the reality of spirit.

Eternity and Time have, to say the

very least, lost some of their distinctiveness.
(C) John Locke's theory of Time and Etennity is an idealism
P2at is far more strikingly modified by the subjectivist and mathe
maticai approach to philosophy than that of Descartes and Leib1.Ibid., p. 373.
2.Ibid., p. 370.
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nitz.

On the whole I Locke

continued to regard Eternity and

Time as actual states in terms of whieh things exist.

Thus Locke

affirms -':;rat we have certr,in l:r,owledge of God and that God is
eternal. (1)

There is underlying all of his thought the assump

tion that material and spiritual substances

exist within a de

termined order which can in this case scarcely mean anything but
a temporal order. (2)

Attention has, however, already been ?all

ed to the fact that Time was formally spoken of by him as no more
than a mode of the idea of duration and that he c alled attention
to the relativity of temporal spans.

His theory may indeed be

spoken of as an idealism that was ever on the verge of becoming
a spiritualism.
{D) The idealism of Berkeley is still less pronounced than
that of Locke.

Berkeley seemed to hold that ideas, although de

pendent upon mind, were objects of knowledge to mind rather than
mere processes of mind.

This would mean that Time which was an

aspect of the series of ideas still belonged in some degree to
the objective realrh.

·with the idealist, Berkeley could still

say that Time was a condition of reality.
reality of which Time was a condition

However, in that the

was dependent upon mind,

it is easy to see how near to spiritualism Berkeley's idealism
was at this point.
In lts cbnc.;ep,t of Eternity Berkeley's idealism is likewise,
although less strikingly, a modified idealism.

Berkeley held

that the Creator and sustainer of all souls and ideas was God •
In that the ideas were unchanging in the thought of God and presented themselves to us as entities, the ultimate existence of
1. Ibid., p •. 322.
2. Ibid., pp. 318, 325.
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which was not dependent upon us, the idealist concept of the
reality of Eternity remains.

But in that even so, the ideas

were dependent upon a spiritual God, there was present a tenden
cy to make Eternity a. state of secondary rather than of primary
existence.

Thus, even Berkeley's idea of the reality of Eternity

is colored by spiritualism.
(E)

Before passing on to the idealistic successors of Kant,

we may pause to note that in David Hume the remaining idealistic
tendencies

of Berkeley have dissipated themselves in a skepti-

cism which denies with equal emphasis the reality of both Time
and Eternity without putting in their place a non temporal pat
tern.

Time was regarded as a hybrid idea composed of a success

ion of distinct ideas but without reality or even corresponding
impression,and Eternity

was thought to be quite unknowable by

intellect.
(F) The successors of Kant took as their point of departure
the structure of the knovring process, quite as much as did the
English empiricists.

Moreover, although their theories were

speculative systems rather than modest inquiries, their conclu
sions regarding Time and Eternity, like those of the English em
piricists, represent modified idealism.

We need deal,in this con

nection,only with the philosophy of Hegel.
Beginning as did Kant with the analysis of mind, Hegel re
fused to believe that the catagories of thought w·e·re simply forms
of thought, but boldly affirmed that, as forms of thought, they
were also forms of reality. (1)

This affirmation in itself ex

cluded the possibility of Hegel's pursuing Kant 1 s course of re
garding Eternity and Time as mere subjective products of thought.
but· did not prevent the expression of affinities of another sort
l.weber and perry, Ibid., P• 407.
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with the spiritualistic trend.
1. Hegel believed in a real Time.

The catagories were

devemoped through a process that involves succession. (1) Indeed,
even the ethical concepts emerged in consciousness and life out
of an evolutionary process. (2)

The Absolute was consciously recog

nized only at the end of a process which seems to be temporal as
well as eternal.

Thus, there seems to be no mistaking the fact

that Hegel was convinced of the reality of Time and that he was
quite as confident as Plato.
2. Hegel believed in the reality of Eternity.

I n discuss

ing Hegel's idea of the process of evolution Thilly writes:
"1he Absolute is eternally that into which it develops••••••Thc
catagories are eternally potential in it � ••.•••• They have never
evolved''.(3)

All of reality is potentially there from the start.

Mind and the universe are ever attempting to actualize what is
potentially eternally there.

Thus Eternity is more than simply

a way of thinking of things�

Just as in Plato,it is a state in

'v'.'fhich something exists.
3. Despite the fact that there is rather definitely in Hegel
a belief in the 1•eality of Time and Eternity, Hegel's thought re
pre sent s a very considerable modification of Platonism in the
dire:ction of spiritualism.

To begin with, the Time

which made

its appearance in Hegel was apparently not the cc::npletely regular
Time of which Blato spoke.

It was ra::ther the Time of accumulating

and suddenly advancing thought 1 of spontaneous biol9gical processes�
of historical uphevals.

It was neither the Time of mechanism,

1. Ibid., p. 4�0.
2. Thilly; Ibid.,pp. 47�, 475.
3. Ibid., p. 470.
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nor of the

perfectly harmonious ordering of tranquil ideas. Its

lack of regularity was expressed in Hegel's well known idea of
thesis, antithe�!s, and synthesis.

It was, accordingly, whether

expressly or not, at least by implication, a Time not unlike the
duree of Bergson., One wonders whether it can properly be called
/

Time at all.
In like manner, the Eternity of which Hegel spoke was by no
means the serene unperturbed order of Ideas of which Plato spoke.
Eternity is rather the condition of that which is at the outset
only vague-and potential, becoming definite and r eal only at the
end of a process.
Finally, both the Eternity and the Time of Hegel's thought
have subjective as well as objective aspects.

In Hegel the in

sistence upon the basic identity of thought and being, of sub
ject and object, is such that whatever may be the nature of Time
and Eternity, they are tinged with subjectivity.

This, of course,

does not mean that Time and Eternity do not belong to reality,
fo½ in Hegel, the only kind of reality that exists is in part,
but only in part, subjective.

It does mean that Hegel is by no

means ready to thihk of Time and Eternity as states of such an
unequivocally objective reality as Plato had in mind.
Thus, while continuing to think of distinct states of Time
and Eternity as belonging to a real world, Hegel so modifies his
ideas of those states as to move strongly in the direction of an
idea of a single state which is the underlying pattern of exist
ence;. and so introduces subjectivity into his whoJ.e system as
to tone down any unequivocal affirmat.ion of the objectivity of
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Time and Eternity.
( G) Leaving aside any attempt to deal with the expressions.
of the idealist tradition which followed Hegel, we pass immediately
to a consideration of an expression of the theory which

we

take

to be fairly representative of recent idea lism.
1. Like Plato, Royce contended that both Eternity and Time
were real.

Thus Royce held that God 1 s life "cons ciously surveys •••

the whole temnoral process • ••• • as one life." (1), and with equal
emphasis that "Time is known to us both perceptually.and,'as.the
psychologists would say, conceptualJ.Y•" (2)
2.

In'Royce, as in Plato, Eternity was thought to consist

primarily in Idea.

A large part of the first volume of Royce 1 s

The World and the Individual

was devoted to an endeavor to

show that knowledge was possible only if Being was of an ideal
character.

Royce was unwilling to say with the spiritualists

that essential

Being was fundamentally undefinable spirit.

Eternity was for him definable Idea.
3.

Like all his modern idealist predecessors Royce's theo

ry modifies considerably the Platonic type of idealism relative
to our problem.

TO begin with, he regards Time as involving the

possibility of psychological spans of various lengths, speaking;
for example, of the span of a man
Falls.
ive

and of the span of Niagara

This in itself represents a softening down of the object

uniformity which Plato ascribed to Time.

Further, the Ideas

to which· Royce ascribed Eternity had far more of a dynamic char
acter than the Ideas of Plato.
nose

Thus Royce insisted upon the pur

involved in ideas, declaring: 11 Whatever else our ideas are ••••

it is certain that they are ideas not because they are masses or
1.
2.

Josiah Royce: The world -�d the Individual, vol. 2, p. 419.
Ibid., P• 113.--
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series of images, but because theyembody conscious purpose.
Every idea is as much a volitional process as it is an intellect
ual process."
4.
the

The chief contribution of Royce to the understanding of

problem of Time and Eternity was, however, not his re affirma

tion of the idealistic nrinciple nor his modification of th��ideal
ist; theory ts 'in ,the dtre.c.tion .

of spiritual ism.

The chief

contribution of Royce's thought relative to our problem was
his conscious effort to show how the ideas of Time and Eternity,
without losing their distinctness, can be harmonious aspects of
the same reality.
Royce argued not only that Eternity and infinite Time can
exist together without contradiction, but that the two are essen
tial to one another.

His argument rests essentia lly upon two

principles: a. the dependence of the parts of Time unon the
Whole; b. the necessity of Time to the perfection of Eternity.
a. Royce contended that the,parts of Time are so depend
ent one unon another that Time is inconceivable apart
Eternity in which all the parts are viewed at one time.

from an
Thus,

for examnle, he declared: "You cannot conceive a cubic foot of
snace destroyed without abstracting from all space; nor can you
suppose this hour to vanish wholly from the time stream without

,,

abolishing all time. (1)
sent

Royce undertook to show how every pre-

was dependent on a rich past and assumed a future which

was·already potentially present in such a way that the whole
had a sort of present being.
a symphony.

His .favorite analogy was that of

"The melody does not come into existence contemporan-

1 � Royce: Ibid., Vol. 1, P• 114.
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eously with its own last note ••••• the melody is the Vlhole,
whereof the notes are but abstracted fragments•••• 11 (1) Royce
held that

the brief

moments

of our consciousness draw

.into simultaneity events which by a more rapid!yfunctioning type
of consciousness might be regarded as successive, that even the
successive present- moments of our consciousness might be viewed
as a simultaneity by a more slowly working type of consciousness,
and that it is accordingly possible that all events in Time might
be drawn into a single simultaneity by the Infinite Consciousness.(2)
b. Royce was equally persuaded that the nature of the whole
or eternal order was such that it attained its perfection only
in the successive order.

A spoken sentence, he contended,

attain

ed its perfection only as its single words were sounded, although
its wholeness did not have to wait for the last sound.

Royce be

leived that the infinite Being, as well as finite beings, appre
hended the temporal order and was made perfect by it.

Thus he

wrote: "God is thus a Person, because, for our view, He is self
conscious, and be cause the Self of which He is conscious is a
Self Whose eternal uerfection is attained through the totality
of these ethically significant temporal strivings, those processes
of evolution, those linked activities of finite Selves." (3)
Thus, for Royce Time and Eternity are harmonious aspects
whiGh together form the pattern of existing reality.
real in its own way.

Each is

Eternity is the totality which is basic

ally ideal, Time is the working out in the discrete and material,
but neither is complete without the other.
of the very essence of reality.
1. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 419.
2. Ibid., pp. 111-151.
3. Ibid., p. 419.

The two together are

84
(III) Recent Expressions of Materialism
Like each of the other ancient theories of the relation be
tween Eternity and Time, materialism has found its representa
tives in the modern world.

Moreover, like each of the other

theories it has under the->influence of the new approach of mo
dern philosophy undergone significant changes. These changes
are of different types,as we shall see.
There is a sense in which all naturalistic philoso

(A)

phy is materialistic in its treatment of the problem of Time
and Eternity.

Nature

is the entity with which it is concerned

and certainly the most conspicuous aspect of nature is the con
stant process of change which it seems to present to the appar
ent exclusion of eternal principles of any great significance.
This materialist
Herbert Spencer.

leaning is illustrated in the philosophy of
It is indeed true that Spencer believed in and

attempted to defend the idea of the Unknowable ( 1) which pre
sumably would imply at least the possibility of an eternal exist
However, Spencer's chief concern was with a nature

ence.

which

conformed to a law of ceaseless change.
Adopting as explanatory principles the ideas of "the

(B)

constancy of matter and force {2) and the universal law of evol
ution",

Haeckel, in effect, not only reduced the types of etern

al principles to one but made even this one ty9e quite dependent
for its, significance unon a process.

That is to say, in Haeckel

the material march of things is what counts.

Neither vital pat

terns nor eternal principles are of any importance in the order
O.f·

reality.

1. Weber and Perry: Ibid.,p. 483.
2. Ibid., p. 488.
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(C) We have shown how the modern siientific ideas concern
ing Time have aided the spiritualists in their contention that
Time is a product of _Spirit.

Modern science has declared that

it sees no evidence for objective Time and that space and Time
must be welded into a single continuum.

The modern spiritualist

has taken these ideas to be evidence that Time is only a sort of
a fiction which spirit creates for its own purposes.

However, as

we have· indicated, the. findings of modern science are capable of
other interpretations.
Bertrand Russell wholeheartedly adopted the ideas of modern
science regarding the want of evidence for objective Time and
the value of the conceut of space-time.

He writes: "We can no

longer speak of a body at a given time, but must speak simply of

____

or again, "We have to make up our minds to the fact

11
an event
, ,.,,

that, with'in certain limits, there is no definite time-order be
tween events which hapnen in different places." (1)

However,

instead of interpreting this to mean that measurable Time is a
fiction of.minds which are in themselves the underlying realities,
Russell interprets it to mean simply that the path of events is
not the same from all points of view, never that it is non-temporal.

Willing to concede with the spiritual ists that reality

cannot be pressed into a completely

uniform time mo�d, Russell

is quite unwilling to concede that this introduces any element
of freedom.

Indeed, he is of the opinion that events,despite

their lack of uniformity,,, follow a rather definitely fixed pattern
which he designates as the"principle'of least action" ( 2)

Time

enters a simgle continuum w�th space and in so doing, instead of
1. Bertrand Russell: "The General Character of Modern Realism" in
Robinson's Anthology of Recent philosophy, p. 295 ff.
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disappearing becomes more than ever an integral part of reality.
The concept of Time is modified, not destroyed..

Thus does Rus

sell refuse to yield to the spiritualist.
However, Russell is equally persistent in his opposition to
absolutism and idealism.

Recent discoveries, he feels, must not

be made to say that the universe involves freedom, but still less
must they be interpreted to mean that the universe involves signi
ficant eternal principles.

Russell concedes to the idealist and

the absolutist that by painstaking investigation it is possible
to discover some things about the way in wr:ich nature works, but
he declines to admit that principles so discovered are of' more
than merely descriptive values.
D. Samuel Alexander does not adont the usual modern four
dimensional concept of space and Time but holds that Time has
true dimensions analogous to those of space.

Making space and

Time the building stones of his universe, he tries to trace their
development throughout all the levels of existence, showing how
life, personality, and even divinity emerge out of them.

Proba

bly more significance is attached to life and mind thru: in the
sys .:.- c:r:i o:':' J.'l3JJ11, but the system seems to go even beyond Rus
sell in a positive affirmation that space and Time are the stuff
out of whieh the universe is built.
Sunm1ary
We are now in a position :to summarize the history of discuss
ion of the problem of the relation of Time and Eternity to realit y.
It was only after civilization had progressed to a considerable
.

.

the �oncBut of
degree
tna-c/\ ·1·ime and Eternity c sme to be separated from the s1;i_rging
c omplexity of the impressions with which reality confronted man.
When at las.t these concepts were distinguished from reality and
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from one another·:, it was naturally assumed that they stood for actual p atterns of reality.

Thus for many centuries the question was

not so much a question as to whether and to what extent reality cora

responded with either concept but question as to which· of the concepts reality corresponded with.

Three views, namely, that Eter ni

ty belongs to reality and Time is an illusion (absolutism), that
both Eternity and Time belong to reality (idealism,), and that riiime
is real and Eternity is unimportant (materialism) came early to ex
pression and contended for the field for many centuries.

However,

from an early date many writers were inclined to present reality
in less rigid patterns than those of completely uniform succession
and sheer timelessness.
There began with Descartes a new approach to metaphysical pro
blems which involved a new emphasis upon mathematics and a new sub
jectivist outlook.

This new approach led at first to varied expres

sions of suspicion that the concepts of Time and Eternity might be
long to mind more than to reality whieh seemed to be akin to both
but different from both.

Then these suspicions were embodied in

a distinct theory which made Time and Eternity mere forms of
thought and regarded reality as having a pattern of spontaneity
that,although not altogether unlike the concepts in question,
could never be described in terms of them.

Prom then on: the .. question as

to whether there is anything in reality corresponding to Time and
Eternity came to the• fore.

The spiritualists adopted the extreme

position indicated above, while other wr:lt ers undertook to blend
the new approach with the older theories, continuing to hold that
either Time or Eter nity or both could still have some p lace in
reali ty even when the importance of mind and of mathematics was
fully recognized.

Part II

Critical Supplement
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It may appear that there is little hope of getting beyond
a group of irreducibl� contradictory theories as to the relation
of Time and Eternity to reality.

However, although such an out

line as we have-presented tends to emohasize differences rather
than likeness, a certain progress is noticeable even here.

New

problems have displaced the old, and some things are in later
times quite taken for granted that in earlier times presented ser
ious difficulties.

A new extreme theory has emerged and older

theories have been modified in the direction of the new theory.
All this cannot but give some hope that the riddle will be in
some measure untangled.
The subject is still too inadequately explored and perhaps at
best too inherently fr«ught with difficulties to make possible a
universally acceptable statement as to the nature of the facts. How
ever, we believe that we can gather out of the diversity of theorfues
some eonclusions :tha;t may be held with assurance.

we shall now

briefly examine each of the four leading theories, attempting to
point out both the obvious weaknesses and the evident contributions
of each and such other faults and virtues in each as seem to us to
be worthy of note.

We acknowledge that to some our judgments will

seem arbitrary, but we trust that we shall have at least some pro
gress in the attemot to find order in the seeming chaos of the theories
concerning the important problem of the relation of Time and Eternity
to reality.
I. Absolutism
A. Value
- The abiding contribution of the absolutists is their
affirmation of the reality of Eternity.

For centuries men had

thought of all reality in common terms which involved mortality
a nd perishing.

In .some religions even the gods

grew

old.

8-9

Vague surmises of an existence of another order than the temporal
had presented themselves.

But as yet there was no clear idea.

Then came Parmenides, perceiving that with existence as such
Time had nothing to do.

It matters little that he pushed his con

clus!lons1 toolfar and supposed that this was all that tp.ere was to
the matter.

Here was one of the most significant discoveries of

thought, that there is reality to which Time does not apply, _that
in the midst of a changing order is - if one will only look for
it - changelessness.
We affirm that definalble ideas, · a:hd '.. princ iples of rea
son or relationships of ideas, are iri no way affected by the Time
process.

To be sure, the objection immediately arises that ideas

do not arise until there are minds and that neither ideas, nor
relations, have any meaning apart from minds in the Time process.
However, we answer with the Platonists that,regardless of vhat
may be said of ideas as mental acts, ideas as ideal possibilities
are in no sense dependent upon their emergence in mind or, indeed,
unon the existence of minds - it is only as a state of ideal pos
sibility or relation that we are at present affirming the fact of
Eternity.

That two and two would make four is a fact that is not

affected by Time,

Regardless of whether or not there are minds

to apprehend, ideally two and two

imply four.

That Eternity is

a state that describes at least this type of reality is a fact
that remains unaffected by any discovery of irregularity in phy
sical processes or spontaneity in life processes.

,Ideas,in so far

as they are ideas, are eternal.
The obj_ection may be raised at this point that an: Eternity· that
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applies only to that which is mere ideal possibility cannot be
genuinely said to apply to reality.

However, as modern thought

seems to be coming increasingly to recognize, even -ideal possibil
ity is reality of a sort.

�o be sure,

dividual concrete existence.,

it is not the same as in

Indeed the Eternity w:hich applies

only to ideal existence can be said only in a iualified sense to
belong to reality; but to reality it still belongs.

Moreover, the

kind of reality represented by ideal possibility is not without
significance.

Such reality is highly important both from

temological and from practical standpoints.

epis

From the epistemo

logical standpoint the fact of eternally existing ideal possi
of ideas, is indispensable to the escape from subjecti

bilitYj
vism.

If my ideas and thought relations are not in some measure

timeless. ideal possibilities,

thep. my picture of reality is

nothing but a transcient vision of a moving scene from a pas sing
perspective, so that it is of value only to me and can neither
be corrected bynor presented to other persons.

Whether or not

w e are ready to go with modern realism all the vrny in ascribing
full objective reality to relations, we certainly must acknow
ledge that· the modern realists have done philosophy a valuable
service in showing the necessity of according some kind of object
ivity to relations

if subjectivity is to be escaped.

Frchm the practical point of view the whole endeavor of
thought is based on the assumption, recognized or unrecognized.,
that concepts and thought relations remain unaffected by the t ime
process.

Mankind never would have had the courgge'to develop a

system of mathematics or of logic, save for the faith that con-
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cepts are timeless.

The a cceptance of the fact of concepts as

eternal is a bas:ie(·

element in what Lotze ( 1) called "faith in

reason�without which thought would come to a �ts.ndstill.
Thus, however unimportant eternal ideas (ideal possibilities)
may seem from an ontological point of view, they seem to be quite
indispensable from the epistemological and pragmatic points of
view.
Our contention thus far is that the absolutists are right
in holding that Eternity or timelessness is a state that charact
erizes at least ideas and thought relations as ideal possibilities

we

and that these ideal nossibilities are not without imoortnnce.

are now ready to advance a further affirmation, namely, that the
reality of the eternal ideas is something more than mere ideal
possibility, that it stands for some kind of actuality in the
mind of God.

Of course it is beyond the scope of this paper to

discuss at length the problem of the existence.

However, some

consideratioramay now be noted that are sufficient for our present
purposes.
We have indicated that epistemology and the practical demand
of thought for a logical foundation

required the existence of

thought relations as ideal possibilities.

The fact is that these

cons iderations are not satisfied with mere ideal possibility;

they

require some kind of actual existence for ideas and relations.
Thou ght is never satisfied to act als � there. · were objectively
real i deas and relations.

It proceeds upon the bas.is that its

judgmen ts and ideas stand for something real which can be verified
by comparison with the experiences of other thinkers.
1. Weber and Perry: Ibid., p. 520.

It is not
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enough to say that ideas have only the reality of ideal possibili
�y;they must stand for something the reality of w hich is at least
comparable with observable fact.

That is why some philosophers

beginning with Plato have insisted upon the actual independent
reality of ideas.
However, the majority has never been quite able to accept
the thought of ideas existing quite apart from minds.

This situa

tion seems to be best met by the Berkelian thought that the ideas
exist in God or that God is the ground of the ideas.

Altogether

apart from other reasons for affirming the belief in a supreme
Being, the thought of a God before Whom all possible ideas and
relations remain as eternal existences- seems to"be the best solu
tion of the epistemological problem before us.

If the eternal

ideas are constantly thought by God, then they take on an actuali
ty that makes them no less real than observed phenomena, yet with
out requiring the difficult assumption that they are actualities
which denend upon nothing.

Human thought stands for something

which is eternally actual, yet iB not bound to

the hypothesis of

independent objective ideas.
Beyond this

the thought of the eternal ideas as belonging

to the mind of God satisfi es at least in part the religious in
sistence upon associating the thought of Eternity with the thought
of God, an insistence which despite the difficulty ( to be noted
later) of ascribing Eternity to a personal God, is not to be ig
nored in any adequate view of reality.
If the foregoing be a tr.ue account of things, Eternity is a
state applying to ideas and relations

as existing in the mind of
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God and absolutism has done a valuable service to thought in
bringing to light a concept representing a fact which is vital to
all thought processes.

In saying this we must note that we do

not by any means regard the ascription of eternal ideas to God
as being as comnlete an account of the life of God as Berkeley
did.

We shall

presently see that the thought in question re

presents only one aspect of the life of God and that perhaps
that a spect is not the most

important.

However, this does not

nullify the value of the recognition of such reality as that of
which we have spoken.
B. Errors
(I) From the.negative side the mistake of absolutism is that
of the denial that temporal processes belong to rerlity.

The mo

tive for this denial seems to have been a feeling that that which
changes and moves is less perfect than that which is changeless,
an idea that has not been confined to absol··.tists or even to
Greek thinkers. (1)

There seems, however, to be no justif iable

ground for the claim that change is necessarily a mark of inferiority.

For the modern man the motive of the Eleatics and the

Medieval mystics seems to lose some of its point.

Apart from

this we need only to note that the human mind grows up in a
world of change, that many of its most obvious impression s are
tho se of change, so that if its impression of change be denied,
there would seem to be little ground for affirming that its other
i�nressions have any validity.
1. Cf. Leibnitzts opposition to Cartesian occasionalism in Weber
and Perry: Ibid., pu. 283, 284.
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( �rI) Beyond the obvious mistake of denying change, we call
attention to certain correlated mistakes

on the positive side.

Co�responding to the absolutist's denial of the world as we see
it, there is in his philosophy the contention that all reality
is eternal.

But this contention does not simply mean that he

denies the reality of all that others affirm to be temporal; it
means that he attributes Eternity to much that others think of
as temporal.

This attributing of Eternity to large areas of

existence has among the absolutists at least two roots which we
musf now consider.
First, on the part of the Eleatics,

the application of the

idea of Eternity to existence as such, i.e., to the essence of
much that would ordinarily be thought of as temporal, seems to
have been based on a peculiarity of the verb to be.
verb to be

Now the

or its participle being ·, onta, implies existence

.altogether irrespective of state,
other factor or condition.

stage of develonment, or any

The Eleatics seem to have taken the

indifference to conditions of the word being

to mean that that

for which the word stood was independent of Time and

change.

They were fond of contrasting the word being with the word be
coming

as though the two were opposites; and nat urally if the

two were opposites, the quality of change (becoming) would be
excluded from all that is (being).
the two are not opposites at all.

But as a matter of fact,
'J1he verb to be

difference to becoming, not opposition to it.
gardless of whether the idea of becoming

implies in

Altoge�her re

from no��i�� is possi

ble, there is certainly nothing in the nature of being to pre-
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elude the possibility of a becoming within being.
apple seed certainly is,

irresnective of what it

it be called a seed or a tree. Indeed

A sprouting

ts - whether

about the most obvious

fact about most of the things that� is that they change.
Neither in observation nor in logic does the fact ofthe ir being
6ne thing preclude the possibility of their
becuming some other thing.

being in process of

,Aristotle is quite right in insist

ing that what is the matter of one thing can be the form of an
other.
Accordingly, the assumntion that being
timelessness is quite without foundation.
in the obvious fact that things are

necessarily involves

There is no warrant

for saying that beneath the

shadow of their illusions they are really changeless.
The second foundation of the attempt to give a very wide
scope to the word Eternity is the mystical experience in which
Time seems to cease, as the believer feels that he becomes one
with God.

Many of the mystics, feeling that their mystical ex

periences represented a contact with ultimate reality, in the
light of which all of their other experiences were pale and
shadowy, have felt that the changeless reality with which they
have come in c ontact is the underlying essence of all reality.
However, several considerations must be kept in mind in this
connection.

In the firs t place, it scarcely seems reasonable

to set aside the overwhelming pre-ounderance ofhuman experience
on the basis of the testimony of a comparatively small c9mpany
of unusual individuals.

In the second place, in the more cul

tured type of religious circles today it will probably be fair
ly generally agreed that conscious meditation and noble life

represent a.,more important type of contact with ultimate Renlity
than mystical experience, and unquestionably such expe riences
involve temporality.

In the third place, the mystical exper ience,

reuresenting an escape from consciousness, is at best not so much
a source of information about the Detlty as an intensifying of inner life.

·the testimony of mystics themselves, while ind.i.c a-cing

a g(muine deepening of sensitiveness to truth, contains little
evidence -cnat new truth has been
itself .

imparted through the experience

If the experience is excepLional and inadequate, and if

it,moreover,fails to offer positive conscious ldeas as to the na
ture of reality, it would scarcely seem legitimate solely upvn
the basis of the form and feeling of the experience, to extend
the concept of Eternity -co include the underlying essence of all
existence.

Acccr dingly, withuui:; deny.i.ng the reality and signifi

cance of mystical experience we mus-c assert that it offers no
adequate basis for the attemut to see in Eternity tbe ultimate
form of all reality.
Beyond the fact that there is no cunvincing evidence either
from the analysis of the c oncept of being or from mysticism to
the effect tha� the underlying essence of all re&li-cy itl eternal,
we call attention

to a positive ground

for holding -cuat cvnscious

existence, whether divine or hunm.n, cannot be com�leLely or even
mainly eternal. Edwyn Bevan in his symbolism and ,cielief (1) has
set forth the thought tno.� s.i.nce �ter:n,ity means complete timeless
ness or the elimination of succession, and since consciousness imf.
plies succession, it is not possible to say that a God Who is per
spnal or conscious is eternal and nothing mo re.
ment seems to us to be conclusive.
1 . Edwyn Bevan:

.

This type of argu

We would accordingly insist

-- ----

Symbolism and Belief,

p. 99 ff.
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that while divine consciousness and human consciousness may not
be, and probably are not, merely temporal in the ordinary sense
(i.e., bounded by and lived in fixed and regular order)
while there are some aspects of

and that

each which are indeed timeless,

neither may apuropriately be described as only eternal in essence.
Of·course the absolutist will reply that he is by no means
concerned to maintain the reality of consciousness.

Yet, a theory

which denies the fact of consciousness cuts the ground from under
itself.

All human systems depend upon consciousness.

.l.'1 or

has

that condept ever been shown to stEmd for an inferior type of
reality.

The fact still remains that it stands not only for that

with which we meet all else but for the highest of all that which
has been met by us.
to a

Consciousness is too meaningful to be reduced

secondary level.

To say that eternal reality is the under

lying essence of consciousness is to nullify thought and to des
troy more of the richness of life than there is any warrant for .
II. Materialism
While the theory which stands as the opposite of absolutism
involves a onesidedness

that must certainly be pointed out, it

likewise involves a historical bequest to thought upon our pro
blem which should not be overlooked.
A. Contribution:
'· ;As the outstanding contribution of absolutism is its affirma
tion that Eternity belongs
its contention

to

reality,

that Time belongs

that of materialism is

to reality.

At first thought

this contention of materialism seems to be so obvious as to re
q1iire no vindication.

Was it not .already, one may ask, included
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in the crude speculations of the ,Ionian physicists long before
materialism was a distinct philosophy?

But that the reality of

Time is not so readily to be taken for granted is quite evident
in

the very fact that the absolutists have so long and earnestly

onoosed it.

Moreover, however. much the reality of Time may have

been imolied in the indefinite theories of the Ionians, it undoubt
edly needed a definite affirmation after the Eleatics had under
taken, after distinguishing Eternity and Time, to deny the latter.
The truth is that. since today not only the old. absolutism but the
newer spiritualism is tending to cast doubts upon the concept of
Time, the connection bet-ween Time and reality must certainly be
carefully considered.
In the first place, one of the most obvious facts about the
observed world which is co:q.stantly thrusting itself in upon us is
the fact of change.

The clouds constantly change their forms.

The water of the river is continually replaced.
to move across the face of the heavens.
another.

The seasons follow one

Our man made structures decay.

young'and then become old and die.

The stars seem

Men themselves are

Even the mountains

their forms and the streams their courses.

change

such an array of

changing events can never suffer us to forget the reality of
successiveness.
In the second place, there is order and regularity in the
changes of the universe by virtue of which they may be at least
partially formulated.

When the facts of the spontaneity of li�e,

the freedom of will, and even the irregularity of movements of
el-ectrons are fully admitted, there remains

a certain statisti-
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cal regularity in the course of events.

Time, in this sense,

has been a foundation of science from the beginning.
so, but the concention of one regular Time
man mind cannot shake it off.

Not only

is such that the hu

It belongs to mind.

There is no

inherent reason why it should not be said to be at least one as
pect of reality.
Some types of events can be fitted with great precision in
to a regular time order, others only with an approximation.

The

time order remains and all events have some relation to it.

The

impossibility of discovering an absolute Time in the physical
world illustrates the fact that the time picture does not tell
the ,,mole story >but it does not dispriove the fact of Time.
one thing to say that no absolute Time is discoverable;
quite another to say that no absolute Time exists.

It is

it is

The discover

ies of modern relativists seem to establish the first point;

but

they do not, as far as we can see, even touch upon the second.
Even the attempt to relegate the whole of observed nature to
the realm of the subjective has been unable to obliterate the
fact of Time.

To begin with, it may be quite fully admitted that

Time belongs to the subjective without denying that Time has a
place in reality.

Kant regarded Time as a form of experience, but

he did not in so doing make Time unreal or even unimportant.

As

a writer to whom we have recently referred po-ints out (1), even if
we denied "that there was any temporal process outside conscious
·mtrids •·····

it would be an absolute truth that t'he experiencin g

individual .did have that series of sensations and feelings

in

temporal order."

In this

1. Edwyn Bevan:

Even the subjedtive is a part of reality.
Symbolism and Belfer, p. 103.

100

sense even a subjective Time belongs to reality.
However, as what has been said above will indicate, our con
tention is that· the reality to which Time belongs is more than
that of subjective mind.

That in which the human mind sees Time

is not simply itself but an external world.

If mind is to be

trusted at all1 it would seem reasonable to admit that the Time
in terms of which it sees reality is at least one aspect of ex
ternal reality itself,

'that .- however impossible it may be to fit

all reality comnletely into the pattern, the pattern certainly
definitely belongs to some types of reality and is at least loose
ly connected with the rest of it.
'rime is too definitely referred to

, something other than

and too essential to man's adjustments to nature to be

m:tnd

hastily relegated to the realm of the subjective.
would be a mistake to try to deny it altogether.

Certainly it
The materialists

have made a real contribution in insisting upon the reality of
Time.
B. Defects
(I) The mest obvious weakness of the materialist theory of the
relation of Time and Eternity to reality is its failure to as
cribe any significant place in reality to Eternity.

To be sure,

the materialist does not exclude implications of the idea of Eter
nity.
critus,

The form of the downward motion, in the thought of Demois presumably unaffected by Time.

of least action

II

,,

Russell's principle

is presumably quite unaltered by the pasf'age

of the centuries. _However, the materialist fails to give any
appreciable significance to the eternal principles which he
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tacitly allows.

The form of downward motion of Democritus's atoms

is merely incidental and Russell's"principle of least action" is
a way of reducing the significance of the permanent to a minimum.
We take it that enough has already been said concerning the
place of Eternity in reality to indicate the chief grounds of
our conviction that a failure to ascribe any significant place
in reality to Eternity is a grave error.

we believe that the

error is the more dangerous because it is obscured by the materi
alists• casual bow in the direction of the recognition of Eternity.
It is just in this sort of thing that many errors in philosophy
consist, namely, in presenting statements which imply essential
facts other than those stressed and yet give the latter no stand
ing within the statements themselves.

In this way the omission

in the formal statements passes unnoticed because the f acts in
question are implied.

But.when the effort is made to build upon

the formal statements the fact is left out of account.

Thus, if

Eternity be such an important fact as we have indicated, the ma
terialist position is evidently gravely in error in attE:mpting
to present a picture of reality in which Time plays a significant role and Eternity is essentially ignored.
(II)However, the difficulty in materialism is not solely the
negative matter of minimizing the fact of Eternity;

there i� in

like manner, a positive error in materialism's attempt to make
rep;ular time succession the sole feat;ure of existence vvith res
pect to temporality.

To put the matter slightly Qifferently, it

has extended the concept of regular ( rr clock11 ) Time to co ver not
only that which is temnoral and that which is eternal but e.lso
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that which
ity.

being in Time has other aspects than uniform regular

Thus, for example,

materialism regards life as working it

self out solely under the pattern of Time.

However, investigation

has at least sugp:ested the possibility, as Mr. Bergson has so well
nointed out, that life forms have not develoned with that regular
ity that we should expect if life forms could be completely brought
under the law of Time.

It may well be that life forms have devel

oped with an irregularity that requires a different sort of pattern�
Again, as Mr.

Bergson holds,

mental life is not purely an un

folding in an unbroken order of Time.
mits

to have its own order.

into a time pattern.

Volition seems within li

It refuses to be altogether fitted

Accordingly, however much Time may be an or

der by which all �rocesses can be measured in certain aspects, it
seems to be an unwarranted procedure to attemnt to extend the
scope of regular Time to such length that it becomes the sole stan
dard of reality with respect to succession.

we shall have more

to say Of this later.
III. Idealism
A. Contributions
( :t-).

To tbe idealists belongs the credit for the discovery

that both the concept of Eternity and the concept of Time des
cribe conditions of reality.

such a discovery will doubtless to

some appear too obvious to be of any importance.

However, it is

sometimes the obvious that needs to be asserted.

Particularly

was this true in a philosophical world in which materialism , on
the one hand, had tended to ignore the fact of Eternity and abso
lutism, on the other hand, had tended to deny the f act of Time.
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It takes on a still greater importance in a modern world in which
spiritualism J taking advantage of the discoveries of recent scienc�
attempts to get rid of both Time and Eternity.

Plato and his suc

cessors have not spoken for naught in reminding us that however
much either Time or Eternity is emphasized

or however much some

factor not describable in terms of wither may be put forward, real
ity has and

will continue to have aspects that can best be des

cribed through the concents of Time and Eternity.

The grounds for

holdinr; that they have been quite right in giving both a standing
in reality we take to be for our purposes adequately indicated in
what we have said above in connection with our discussion of abso
lutism and materialism concerning the place in reality of Eternity
and the nlace in reality of Time, respectively.
(II) Glosely,::as sooiated with the idealis:t insistence upon the
rea lity of both Time and Eternity is another idealist thought
which represents a distinct contribution to thought regarding the
relation of Time and Eternity to reality.

common sense is likely

to keep before us the fact that both Time and Eternity belong to
reality; but absolutism , on the one hand, and materialism, on the
other, insist upon another difficulty than want of evidence for
the reality of either concept.

They contend that the concepts are

contradictory, that if you accopt the one you must reject the otherJ
and vice versa.

In face of this ., idealism has rightly endeavored

to show that basically Time and Eternity are quite harmonious con
ceuts that enter into a unified pattern of re8.lit:,., that neither
concent is to be excluded from reality because it does not accord
with the other.
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we have noted how Plato undertook to show in the Timaeus.
that Time wa� of all that was create�most like Eternity.

Time

was never to be thou3ht of as the antithesis of Eternity but as
its best expression.

In like manne½ we have seen that Royce

undertook to show how the part of the symphony, while being itself,
belonged to the whole.
The truth of the idealist thought of the harmony of the con
cepts of Time and Eternity is recognized even by such an opponent
of idealism as Bergson who, W!iile denying the value of the con.!
cepts, feels that they belong together and even tends to obliter
ate the

distinction between them.

Bergson holds that "clock

time", which is what is ordinarily meant by the word Time,

is

static and therefore not essentially different from space and
mechanical principles.
more than unchanging

Bergson seems to feel that Time is nothing
principles spread ·out.

We need only add

that while we believe Bergson to be mistaken in this extreme posi
tion, it certainly lends aid to the idealist thought that Time
and Eternity are not mutually exclusive concep ts.
The grounds upon which we,;support the idea of tlle essential
harmony of Time and Eternity are quite simple.

In the first place,

we hold that each concept of the two really implies the other.
Time implies Eternity and Time is an ordered continuum which either
exists or measures existences ( It makes no difference for our
pr8sent purposes).

But in the very fact of the order is implied

something that is not affected by change, i.e., something eternal.
But if an eternal order of Time

is imnlied in the concept of

�ime, there is no inherent reason why other eternal possibilities
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or ideas should be excluded by the fact of Time.
ty imulies Time.

Likewise, Eterni

Eter nity means nothing else than timelessness.

But being apart from Time certainly imolies an idea of Time.
�he objection may be raised at this noint that this applies
only to concepts, that whereas the concepts may be compatible,
the realities are not.

Indeed, but contradiction

applies to

concents rather than to existences, so that when it is shovvn that
two concepts are logically compatible the only way of showing that
they are actually antithetical is to show that one or the other
does not in fact

exist.

However, with reference to the probloo

before us, grounds have already been furnished to show that the
actuality neither of Time nor of Eternity can be denied.
This leads us to a second ground, namely, that in the effort
to describe the existing universe it is necessary to acknowl edge
the existence side by side of eternal principles and uniform suc
cession.

The explanation of no event approaches completeness un

til some account has been given , on the one hand, of the compara
tive extent of its duration and, on the other hartd,
ing principles which were involved in it.

of the endur

Indeed, the effort of

science through the centuries has been to discover

how to reduce

to formulae, which involve Time as one of the factors and eternal
nrincinles as another
-

/

the varirus facts of the universe.

The two

together make up a single pattern of reality neither side of which
can be ignored by any attempted scientific exnlanation.
In the third place, the acknowledgement of

fil;).

actual time

order imnlies the existence of actual eternal principles.

Immedi

ately you allow that events follow a certain uniform pattern, you
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must admit the existence of eternal principles through which
the facts fit into the pattern.

Without some such principles

all order diBappears from the time scheme, and Time without or
der is no longer Time.
Accordingly, we take it that the idealists have been quite
right in contending that Time and Eternity are harmonious, sup
plementary aspects of a single pattern, so that neither could
be denied a place in reality on account of the other.
B. Defect
The chief defect of idealism is its supposition that the
Time-Eternity form is the pattern of all reality or that all real·i
ty can be pressed into the forms of Time and Eternity.

That the

Time-Eternity pattern may be applied to all forms of concrete
existence in some way is plain enough; but this is very different from the supposition that that form adequately represents
everything in all types of concrete existence that has to do with
succession.

Thus, for example, consciousness may be to some ex

tent measured in terms of Time and Eternity.
ideas.

You may list its

You may check its progress at various points, measure

its objective results in any given period.

But to suppose that

this is to give an adequate account of the leaping, darting, cir
cling variety of its life even during a brief interval is to sup
pos� an absurdity.

Even if from the outside consciousness could

be reduced to a pattern, every attempt to state the essence of
its inner existence in terms of any kind of a pattern, however
complex, is doomed to failure.
What may be said of consciousness is, in general, true of life.
Certainly, the Time-Eternity pattern may be applied to it, but that
pattern does not by any means tell the story of its successive

107

leaps, reversions, and advancements.

As a matter of fact

science has, as we have already indicated, thrown doubt - to say
the very least- upon the idea that even the physical movements of
inorganic bodies can be adequately described in terms of a r,egular
time.

Modern science's quantum theory, principle of uncertainty,

spaceTtime, and the like, are expressions of the limitations of
the accepted Time-Eternity pattern.

Thus, we insist that that pat

tern, however real and convenient as a measure of some types of
reality, is not in the same way the pattern of all reality.
IV. Spiritualism
A. Contributions
(I) Probably the most significant contribution of spiritualism
is its testimony that reality has aspects which cannot be described
either in terms of space or in terms of Time and Eternity.

Thus

we find Kant presenting the idea of an indefinite "thing in itself"
as the nearest that intellect can come to description of ultimate
reality.

Again we find Fichte talli:ing about an ego which, vrhile

it is sometimes called eternal, is evidently not intended to be
eter nal in the strict sense.

When we come to Bergson we have a

I

distinct word dure_�J as an attempt to express that which, he feels,
falls outside the usual forms.
In discussing the defects of idealism we have already indicat
ed how some types of reality, namely, consciousness and life, do
not fall within the Time-Eternity pattern.

We now pursue the pro

blem of the scope of the Time-Eternity pattern somewhat further.
It is nuite a commonplace that almost no events proceed wi th
the 1-?-Ilerring regularity of Time.

Probably a hypothetical star
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moving forever in one direction would be the only type of move
ment that '.)Would rep resent such regularity, for

even circular

movement is marked by recurring intervals for w hich Time allows,
but to which it is indifferent.

Actually we are reasonably sure

that there is no such movement, end even if there were, irregu
larity would be introduced by the thought of the relation of the
moving star to o:bher stars.

11

But", the idealist repliGs, "this

is precisely where Eternity comes in;

we admit ther e is no mo

tion altog�ther regular like Time, but there are certain eternal
principles which when altogether known, can enable us to show the
exact relation of events to the time pattern and so to bring all
under the

Eternity-ri::'ime order 11 •

urinciules be discoverable t

very well,if such comprehensive

The fact is that they have not yet

been discovered and there seems to be far less prosuect of their
ever being discovered than there seemed to be a few years ago�
Admittedly rigid principles can be fairly readily applied to
certain types of events, but not only have psychology and bio
logy refused to reduce themselves to mechanical terms but physics
has rather generally abandoned rigidity and a��itted some uncer
tainty in minute events.

It is reasonable to hold that reality

never will be entirely recuced to a mechanical time 01•der. Cer
tainly not even the fondest dreamer would claim that science has
accomDlished that end.
But

if there seems little ·prospect

of showing how all of

the facts by et�rnal principles fit into-the time �rder, the
question may be asked: What point is there in continuing to assert that all reality falls under the order of Time and Eternity?
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It would seem that until evidence is forthcoming of likelihood
of our

being able to reduce all to formulae of Time and Eterni

ty, it is demanded of us that we continue to hold open the pos
sibility that there is more to reality than can.be encompassed
in these forms.

Indeed, in face of such aspects of reality as

consciousness. �nd life
hood

which remain so remote from any likeli

of being reduced to the forms of 'Dime and Eternity, it

would seem that the overwhelming probability is on the side of
the presumption that reality is broader than these forms.
At this point, of course

the question arises: "What is this

that has to do with succession but is neither Time nor Eternit y?"
(Is is some other kind of order ?

If so, why can it not be com

nletely coordinated with the Time-Eternity order? )

The answer

of the spiritualists is that it is freedom or spontaneity.

That

is to say, it is an inner principle of free self determination
whi�h , wbile not without guiding principles or general directions,
can never be forced into any completel y determined pattern.

We

deem this answer to be quite satisfactory, for not only does it seem
to correspond to the experience that every conscious individual
knows, but it' seems to be the only type of definition possible.
Any attemnt to formulate a precise pattern of those aspects of
reality which do not fall within the Time-Eternity patt,;rn is
only to fasten unon them forms which could ultimately be reduced
to a Time and Eternity pattern a�d so to move in a circle.

we

can therefore sce.rcely go beyond saying that by t}:).at which cannot
be placed under Time by eternal formulae we simply mes.n that
which never can be completely formulated at all.

The only pattern
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of spontaneous reality that can be formulated is t}1at of its past
which modifies but does not determine its future.
(II) In what has been said up to now one imoortant question has
been left out of account.

It has been admitted that a Time and

Eternity pattern which involves ideas and unchanging principles
and a uniform order of succession belongs to reality and at the
same time that a pattern of spontaneity which is never f1xed
until its events are passed belongs to reality.

The question

emerges as to the relative standing in reality of these two.
Are both upon an equal footing?

Is one basic?

If so, which?

Obviously this is a question that cannot be satisfactorily
settled apart from a general ontological in.-1uiry which is beyond
the scope of this paper.

All we can do for the present is to

indicate the general nature of our position, and acid some brief
notes in defense and application of it.

We venture, then, to

assert that while the Time-Eternity pattern
peatedly asserted,never to be

is,as we have re

excluded from the realm of object

ive reality, reality is basically of the nature of feee spirit,
and, accordingly, that the sniritualist s are

right not only in

asserting that a spontaneity outside the Time and Eternity patter.in
exists

but also in claiming that that spontaneous reality is of

basic importance.
We believe upon grounds which are too complex to be detailed
here that beyond all finite realities is an Infinite Spirit, that
basically every event involves an element akin to.will, that even
events which aupear quite mechanical have a sort of a volitional
aspect.

In defence of this position we shall be content with four
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general remarks.

First, belief in an infinite God finds support

alike in the imnress which nature is constantly making upon our
minds and in special religious experience which cannot be disre 
garded in any philosophical inquiry.

second, if belief in God

is to be t,-0ken seriously it would seem to imply that in some
sense the divine life penetrates all reality.

Third, in daily

experience as it is actually lived, apart from thoughts about
it, events are encountered as resisting forces not unlike

wills.

Fourth, the picture of atom�c structure given us by recent science
certainly does not contradict and seems in a measure to support
the view presented here.
Without attempting further to enter

into the involved sub

ject of the ultimate structUt' e of reality, we contend that if the
above is a true picture of reality, unchanging principles and uni
form succession, while they may still belong to reality, are inci
dental to a basic spontaneous life.

�e hold that idea� are aspects

of reality and thr� the regular succession of events is likewise
a part of reality but that the scope of the reality that exactly
corresponds to them is limited, and that even that reality has
underlying elements of which they

are no adequate measure.

The

ideas and ideals of a man are real parts of his mental li fe, but
if we want to see his mental life as it is we have to see it as a
moving arena of stresses and strains, of emotional and intellect
ual patterns in which the ideas are only static sections, "snap
shots" or series of them.

Even the "clock time'' which he is perhaps

noting is only a rough approximation, a pattern into which his
ideas may be fitted.

Essentially they come and go,to be sure,

with some orderliness but never in any completely predictable way.
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Neither ideas nor Time can stand alone.

111he objectivity

which both present to us is dependent upon the Divine Mind.

In

tellectual concepts are, as we have suggested, thoughts of God.
Mors.l ideals are His moral nature and commands, and the Time pro
cess is His orderly way.

No one of these is self subsistent.
Yet none of them is the

Each is dependent upon the Divine Mind.
essence of the Divine Mind.

There are aspects of God's nature

that can best be defined conceptually as ideas, others as moral
ideals, others as a Time order, but essentially God is beyond
them all just as a man is beyond his ideas.

God is essential ly

living Spirit and_, although looking at His nature in various ways
we find grounds for assertion of the reality of ideas, ideals,
living
and Time, these are only static representations of aAR�ality. A
yard stick applied to a tapestry will give us the measurements of
the tapestry, but no one supposes that that is the essential fact
about the tapestry.

A

formula

regarding the speen of falling

water, the volume of the water, etc., will mee.sure Niagara, but
no one supposes that that is an adequate nresentation of Niagara.
(III) Of course

the affirmation that there are important aspects

of re8li ty which are neither temporal nor eternal nor both
dema.nds--and spiritualism has felt called upon to give-some kind
of an explanation of the fact of Time.
to adont the idea that Time is
tellect.

I n general, it has tended

only a subjective proctuct of in

Now, while this judgment seems to be mistaken, it has

led to a recognition of this truth, which

may be .regarded as a

contribution of spiritualism , that Eternity and Time, instead of
being the sole patterns of reality relative to succession, are as-
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nects of the patterns of r eality selected

by mind for pnactical

purposes.
There are good reasons, already suggested in pa:et, for re
fusing to rel�ate Time and Eternity to the realm of the subject
ive.

Time and Eternity are too universally accepted, too widely

applicable, too closely associated with the very foundations of
knowledge for that.

But these objections do not apoly to the

idea that mind selects

out of a reality consisting of many pos

sibilities certain aspects which make up a pattern of Time a nd
Eternity.

Indeed, if we have been right in saying that Time and

Eternity are real

and that spontaneity is also real, there se ems

to be no other WB.y of accounting for Time and Eternity than by
acknovvledging that mind has for practical purposes chosen out of
a broader reality those aspects that make up the Time- Eternity
pattern.
While not many outside the spiritualist group will care to
adopt the extreme subjectivist idea of 1.l1ime and Eternity, the
modified form o.f the idea which we find implied in the coexistence
of spontaneity and a Time-Eternity pattern will doubtless have a
wider appeal.

Such a view will represent the thought of all

t hose who believe that not all reality can be crowded into a
Time-Eter�ity mold and who yet find it impossible to deny the
existence of both. Indeed, not only is the idea that the Timeis
Eternity patternAa selection of certain kindred aspects of ree.lity the only possible

reconciliation of the facts ., it is one which

is reasonably easily understood along lines sugges ted by Bergson
and the pragmatists.

It is not difficult to see why mind should
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have been more inclined to select

the Time-Eternity pattern

as the plan of reality relative to succession than to select the
element of spontaneity.

Spontaneity means unpredictability.

Mind, in tee�ing practical ends, would naturally concentrate on
that which may be foreseen with a reasonable d.egree of accuracy,
and so tend to disregard the spontaneous.
B. Defects
(I) The most obvious defect in spiritualism is its tendency
to minimize the place of the ideas of Time and Eternity in reali
ty.

Thus in Creative Evolution Bergson suggests that the ideas

of Time and Eternity have been developed by men of pract�cal
minds for practical purnoses and that if you want to get at
reality you have to get as far away from them as possible.

such

concepts as spirit, life, and nerson probably get closeB to the
heart of reality than the concepts of Time, Eternity, :logic,and
the like.

However, this is no adequate ground for thrusting the

latter ideas out of the realm of reality altog.ether.

If the hu

man mind is to be trusted at all it must be admitted that our
concepts of Time_ and Eternity stand for something real.

we trust

that what has already been said in connection with absolutism
materialism, and idealism

has set forth reasonably well positive

grounds for this contention.
(II)

A second and equally obvious error of spiritualism is

its attempt to make Time and Eternity merely products of mind.
As we have suggested, there is in spiritualism's-idea a truth,
which we have tried to indicate, of the selective activity of
mind in the formation of the concept of Time and Eternity.

But
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selection and creation are two different things.

Mind does not

place something new in reality, rather it discovers and selects
something that is already there.

Again, we take it that the

grounds for the position in question have been sufficiently
touched uoon in the fongoing pages.
Conclusion
Having now briefly sketched the history of the leading types
of theory of the relation of Eternity and Time to reality, and;.:wha.t
we consider to be the major contributions and defects of each,. the
broad outline of a tbeory which emerges from the study ought to
be apparent.

We conclude with a very brief sketch of such a

theory which will be seen to be simular to, though noticeably dif
ferent from, the theory of Bergson.
Reality, we take it, is vast, infinitely complex,and unfathom
able as far as our minds are concerned.
approximations of the truth about it.

our best ideas are only
By means of them we appre

hend now this phase, now that, of its manysidedness, but always
to discover that we have only a part of the truth.
weltering sea

out of this

of intellectually perplexing reality1 mind intui

tively selects certain aspects that make up a uniform succession
in reality and chooses out certain principles which are actually
unaffected b y change.

·,

The elements in question are�by virtue of

the fact that they are selections, not the whole of reality, but
they belong to reality just the same.
Gradually definite conceots of Time and Eternity emerge, and
as eternal principles are used to fit events into Time,

a Time-
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Eternity pattern emerges.

This pattern, like its separate coI?-

stituents actually belongs to certain selected aspects of reality.

err-

It has been apnlied b y human thought to different levels �r reality with varying degrees of success.

With respect to some types of

reality, e.g., ordinary physical events, it corresponds almost
precisely with the essential facts.

However, with respect to

other types of reality, e.g., consciousness, it measures only
the external form or boundaries of the things and tells us little
of the thing itself.
Beyond that selected reality which constitutes Time an d
Eternity is a spontaneous volitional reality much of which can be
measured only in a hopelessly inadequate way by the Time-Eternity
pattern and which underlies even that in reality which conforms
to that pattern.
orderliness.

This underlying

spontaneity is not vrithout

Indeed it has aspects ·which can best be described

as eternal principles and uniform Time succession - in this sense
Eternity and Time remain real, -

but it must be remembered that

these aspects are but aspects, that they may be sai d to be only
onesided glimpses of what is essentially far more comprehensive.
An arrow that points the general direction belonging to the flow
of a river and a law of gravitation that belongs to its fa ll tell
something of the river,

but the arrow and the law are only select

ed descriptive aspects.

The river is much more.

Time points a

direction of the flow of reality and Eternity states some of its
formulae but these are only selected determined e"l.ements; reality
is vastly more.
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